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Chapter 1 
 
Medicine, Politics, and Liberalism 
in the Career of Rudolf Virchow 
 
 
 
 
“Medicine is a social science, and politics is nothing more than medicine  
on a grand scale”. 1  In this celebrated statement, the nineteenth-century  
German physician Rudolf Virchow (1821-1902) summarized his belief in  
the utter inseparability of medicine from politics. Virchow regarded medicine  
not merely as the study of human disease but also as a general metaphor for  
understanding society. What most people regarded as medicine per se—the  
treatment of illness and the alleviation of suffering—was actually a microcosm  
of Medicine in the grand sense, which took society as its patient. Just as  
medicine in the everyday sense provided the stethoscopes and scalpels by  
which to elucidate and rectify individual sickness, so Medicine in Virchow’s  
sense could rely on rigorous investigation and decisive intervention to cure  
social ills. And just as medicine also embraced a moral concern for the well-being  
and happiness of individuals in suffering, so Medicine dictated that the  
political system had an ethical obligation to improve the health and material  
condition of the less fortunate in society. The politician and the physician,  
if not one and the same, at least had the responsibility to co-operate in  
applying political salves to societal wounds. 
Rudolf Virchow lived during a formative time, both in the political life  
of his nation and in the development of German medicine. He witnessed  
the founding of the German Empire, and the rise of Bismarck’s Prussia to  
become the leading power of Continental Europe, as well as Robert Koch’s  
bacteriological theory of disease, which made it possible to locate the bacilli  
for tuberculosis and cholera. Virchow himself made an astounding number  
of contributions to both medicine and politics. His reputation rests, first  
and foremost, on his seminal achievements in medical science. Medical  
students still memorize Virchow’s Triad to help them diagnose blood clots,  
and consumers of pork can thank him for having discovered the bacillus  
for trichinosis. By far his most important work was in pathology, a discipline  
he revolutionized. Virchow’s canonical textbook, Cellular Pathology, argued  
that cells arise only from other cells, not from spontaneous generation,  
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and that the study of disease should focus on cellular abnormalities. His  
pathbreaking contention that the cell is the fundamental unit of life has  
only recently been challenged by the rise of the gene. 
A rigorous empiricist, Virchow resisted endorsing Darwinism in the  
absence of concrete and convincing research; a committed humanist, he  
wrote a book extolling Goethe’s work as a student of nature. Virchow saw  
no contradiction in combining these identities. Medicine, for him, effortlessly  
reconciled hard-nosed science and ethical humanism. And since he regarded  
medicine as a social science, Virchow devoted tremendous energy to disciplines  
he saw as its natural adjuncts in the empirical study of human beings,  
principally archaeology and physical anthropology. He excavated with  
Schliemann at Troy and helped acquire vast ancient treasures for the  
museums in Berlin. He edited Germany’s most important scholarly journal  
of ethnology. Most famously, Virchow supervised a study of seven million  
German schoolchildren disproving the existence of a predominantly blond- 
haired, blue-eyed Aryan racial type. 2  He also amassed a collection of four  
thousand carefully measured skulls and used them, similarly, to dispute the  
correlation between race and cranial capacity. 
Among what he saw as the social sciences, politics offered Virchow the  
richest opportunities to practise medicine on a grand scale. His activities in  
politics were as impressive as his dedication to the various branches of  
empirical investigation. He manned the barricades in the 1848 Revolution,  
helped found the German Progressive Party, tangled with Bismarck during  
the founding of the Reich, and sat for ninety-six years of combined,  
concurrent service to local, regional, and national German parliaments.  
Virchow also famously coined the term Kulturkampf, a “struggle of  
civilizations”, to describe, favourably, the German state’s assault on the  
Catholic Church in the 1870s. Not surprisingly, Virchow attempted to  
connect his interests in medicine and politics, and through his achievements  
developed a practical philosophy to explain their interaction. In his writings  
he advocated a cooperation between doctors and statesmen aimed at  
securing the health of citizens in the broadest possible matrix of their social  
and political interactions. And through his concrete interventions, he capitalized 
on the possibilities of this politicized medicine in such fields as sanitation,  
epidemiology, professional reform, forensic medicine, hospital construction,  
medical statistics, and medical welfare legislation. 
Contemporary scholarship has barely penetrated the meaning of Virchow’s  
famous utterance and of his medical politics in general. Some writers view  
“medicine on a grand scale” merely as an inspirational slogan. Leon  
Eisenberg extols Virchow’s willingness to defend health care as an ethical  
right and to pursue its realization on a political level. 3  Daniel Pridian  
explains that this personal crusade arose from Virchow’s belief that the  
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social bases of disease - poverty, ignorance, and oppression - needed a  
political remedy just as the biological factors needed a strictly biomedical  
one. 4  Both Eisenberg and Pridian are just two examples of a much more 
general tendency towards hagiography in accounts of Virchow’s contribution 
to medical politics. Other scholars regard Virchow more suspiciously, taking  
his bold statement as a literal political principle. Karl Figlio views Virchow’s  
bid to extend medicine into social affairs as an instance of scientistic politics;  
the encroachment of medicine into social diagnosis and cure “might have  
brought a technocratic, authoritarian state” in which doctors were “the  
experts to run society on scientific principles”. Paul Weindling argues for  
Virchow’s professional self-interest from another perspective, maintaining  
that Virchow in fact endorsed absolute freedom of physicians from state  
control, so that “doctors should be free from social accountability”.5  In this  
conception, Virchow’s grand pronouncements on medicine and politics were  
merely the smokescreen for a deeper professional arrogance. 
Erwin Ackerknecht’s 1953 study is by far the best complete biography of 
Virchow in German or in English and treats his medical and political ideas 
completely separately. It remains indispensable as a guide to Virchow’s 
activities as a doctor, statesman, and anthropologist.6 However, in discussing 
these identities independently and in succession, Ackerknecht cannot fully  
convey how his subject conceived of them as parts of a unified life’s work.  
Virchow lived at a time when science and politics were only just coming  
to be seen as separate vocations. 7  Many of his bitterest conflicts with  
contemporaries stemmed, in part, from his controversial attempts to apply  
the same standards and values to both fields. Virchow’s frictions with  
Bismarck, who once challenged him to a duel over a perceived insult to his  
honour, show this quite clearly. Bismarck saw Virchow as a dreamy professor,  
an idealist, an interloper. Referring to him in the Prussian parliament,  
Bismarck noted: “Politics is not an exact science ... I fully recognize the  
prominence of the speaker in his field of expertise [but] since [he] has  
amateurishly stepped out of his field and into mine, I must say that his  
politics strikes me as lightweight”.8 At a time of ongoing professionalization,  
Virchow blithely overstepped not only the disciplinary boundaries within  
science, but also the profoundly political divisions between science and  
society at large. Any approach to his life compartmentalizing his  
achievement leaves unanswered the critical question of how, in Virchow’s  
view, science should inform politics, and vice versa. 
A more promising approach, and one which I favour, interprets Virchow’s  
dictum in the context of his lifelong liberalism. In this view, the analogy  
Virchow made between medicine and politics reflected a deep ideological  
conviction that liberalism provided a common basis for each. Virchow’s  
theory of a “cell-state”, for instance, drew parallels between the human  
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body, composed of equally viable cells, and the body politic, consisting of  
individuals enjoying equal rights. 9  More generally, his commitment to free  
scientific discourse and an open, multi-causal account of disease can be seen  
as the inspiration behind a political programme embracing democracy,  
pluralism, rational education, secularism, and other liberal values.10 Medicine  
on a grand scale, in this conception, meant rigorously applying the liberal  
values enshrined by medical science on a political level. This approach  
recognizes Virchow’s positive contribution to German liberalism while also  
acknowledging its weaknesses. Sometimes, Virchow’s medical values steered  
his politics toward precisely the kind of dictatorial scientism feared by his  
critics. Thus, during the Kulturkampf, his worship of scientific reason led  
him to support the German state’s patently illiberal repression of the  
Catholic Church as a crusade against superstition. At other times, Virchow  
deployed his scientific insight to vindicate the humane values so cherished  
by his admirers. Most notably, in his dispute with Ernst Haeckel, Germany’s  
leading proponent of Darwinism, Virchow assailed the empirical basis of  
evolutionary theory to undermine the idea that natural selection favours an  
undemocratic social hierarchy. 11 
Virchow’s liberalism married a robust, substantive set of political claims  
with a subtly yet distinctly partisan approach to the ascertainment of  
scientific truth. Unlike many present-day liberals, he did not, in other words,  
treat politics as a neutral space embodying no particular conception of the  
good life, or cordon off science as a value-free arena for the professionally  
disinterested adjudication of empirical claims. 12  Like nineteenth-century  
liberals in general, Virchow lived in a world where liberalism was one  
ideology among many, not a framework for all the others. Like German  
liberals in particular, he confronted this fact through hard experience.  
German liberalism, to an unusual degree, competed for hegemony with  
rival ideologies like socialism, conservatism, and, later, radical nationalism 
- all very articulate philosophies, each with its own political apparatus and  
scientific proponents.13 That Virchow had to contend with such rivals helps  
explain why his scientific and political activity frequently took the form,  
not of incremental practical reforms, but of sweeping ideological crusades.  
Virchow often utterly failed to recognize he was engaged in contests  
over ideology, not truth. Yet for this very reason, a purely ideological  
analysis of his work and thought cannot account for the many practical  
successes his crusades achieved. To assess what Virchow’s liberalism truly  
implied requires an attention to the specifically medical projects (as opposed  
to the grander ideological undertakings) in which his politics and his science  
actively intertwined. In fact, Virchow’s willingness to undertake mundane  
activities in health care reform demands such an approach. After all, it was 
precisely in the these smaller-scale arenas that medicine on a grand scale would  
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find actual, and not merely metaphorical, applica tion.  
To give this historical context more concrete meaning I have chosen three  
particularly revealing episodes from Virchow’s life. Chapter Two deals with  
Virchow’s political awakening in 1848, when he was sent to observe an  
epidemic then raging in the poverty-stricken Prussian district of Upper  
Silesia. Newly sensitized to the social causes of disease through this  
experience, Virchow developed the belief that “medicine on a grand scale”  
required political regeneration along liberal lines. Rushing back to Berlin,  
Virchow found in the 1848 Revolution the opportunity to refine his  
philosophy through the so-called “medical reform” movement, in which  
physicians attempted to improve their professional condition through liberal  
political activity. Far from narrowly serving their own interests, as Weindling  
suggests, the medical reformers sought a more activist and significant role  
in the liberal regeneration of society. This revolutionary context nurtured  
Virchow’s medical politics at the same time as it ultimately condemned his  
activities to political failure. Liberalism’s defeat forced Virchow to retrench  
and pursue health care reform in a less revolutionary and less ambitious,  
but still liberal, political context .  
Chapter Three discusses Virchow’s successful attempt to find a more  
congenial context for the realization of medical politics through his 
participation in the construction of Berlin’s sewer system. Through his  
detailed medical research and his prominence as a city councilman, Virchow  
provided both the scientific backing and public health justification necessary  
to implement the “canalization” project. But he also owed an enormous  
debt to the political power of urban liberalism in Germany and in Berlin  
specifically. What appears to be a completely apolitical undertaking -  
sanitation reform - was actually a rallying point for liberals who sought to  
transform the cities into enclaves of political power. Public health reforms  
not only enhanced the image of cities dominated by liberal politicians, but  
also seemed to validate the tenets of liberal ideology itself. While tangibly  
improving the living conditions of every inhabitant, such reforms otherwise  
preserved social relations and avoided radical redistributions of wealth.  
Owing to their technical nature and only indirect social impact, projects  
like canalization were thus appropriate reforms for an ambitious liberal  
municipal government to undertake. Tracing the obstacles and opportunities  
in capturing sewerage reform as the province of urban liberalism, and  
elucidating Virchow’s relation to this effort, constitutes the true subject  
of my third chapter. 
If municipal politics remained a bastion of liberal influence in medical  
affairs for Virchow, parliamentary politics was a source of frustration.  
Chapter Four takes his parliamentary activity in medical politics as an  
opportunity to discuss the broader possibilities for health care reform in  
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Imperial Germany. In a variety of areas ranging from national sickness  
insurance legislation to Koch’s bacteriological theory of disease, political  
and professional developments conspired to restrict the scope of the  
interventionist social medicine espoused by Virchow. To be sure, the founding  
of the German Empire in 1871 gave medical reformers an unprecedented  
opportunity - in the form of a unified and powerful state - to sponsor  
nationwide health care projects. The consolidation and increasing influence  
of the German medical profession in these same years gave health care  
reformers like Virchow the benefit of a corps of physicians to carry the  
burden of practical activity. However, the conservative character of the new  
empire and the medical profession’s turn towards narrow interest group  
politics diminished the chances for Virchowian liberalism. Chapter Four  
therefore argues that Virchow’s marginalization was not simply the product  
of his dogmatic adherence to liberal democratic principles after their partial  
eclipse in Bismarck’s Reich, but arose more generally from the inability to  
pursue health reform in a political environment that had in some ways  
transcended liberalism. 
A clear pattern emerges in these episodes, tying Virchow’s pursuit of  
medical politics to the broader fortunes of liberalism in nineteenth-century  
Germany. Put simply, Virchow’s liberalism succeeded in municipal politics  
but failed on the national level in 1848 and in Bismarck’s Empire.  
In this pattern of success and failure, Virchow’s career exemplified the  
predicaments of a liberal social scientist. In each of the three different  
historical contexts treated below, the outlook of this peculiar political hybrid  
provides a model connecting Virchow’s liberalism to his medical politics.  
When liberalism was still a combative creed, not yet a neutral ideology, the  
social science it inspired took on an overtly reformist cast. The primary  
thrust of liberal social science was thus to reconstitute society in order to  
bring it in line with liberal principles. In Virchow’s case these principles  
emphasized individual rights (including health), democratic government,  
science and reason, and education. The liberal social scientist also had a  
commitment to avoid revolutionary expropriation and socially subversive  
programmes that threatened the limited goals toward which liberal  
reformism aspires. It might be necessary to employ radical means to  
implement reform, but these means must not threaten the moderate ends  
at the heart of liberalism.  
 This need for containment is the crucial dilemma of liberal social science 
- one less apparent, though equally present, in its more anodyne twenty- 
first-century incarnation - and Virchow wrestled with it repeatedly in his  
medical politics. Very early on, it led him to develop two abiding  
commitments that continually thrust him into contact with the political  
forces around him. First, Virchow advocated the empowerment of a social  
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class that would carry the banner of reform and moderate its subversive  
potential. At times he identified this élite as the educated bourgeoisie, but  
more provocatively, he lauded his own profession as the standard-bearer of  
liberalism and progress. Second, Virchow implicitly and explicitly invoked  
the power of a liberal state to channel and direct the energies of a reformist  
élite, and to ensure social stability in the process. This notion may seem  
incongruous in a man who has been called a “libertarian”, 14  but Virchow’s  
animosity toward the German state as it was constituted in the nineteenth  
century, and his desire to free society from its clutches, did not cause him  
to reject the concept of a powerful state in itself. It simply meant that his  
ideals could not always find expression within the political realities he  
confronted, whether in Berlin or in the empire as a whole . 
 By casting Virchow as a liberal social scientist I hope to demonstrate his  
belonging in the broad political movement of German liberalism in a  
more fundamental way than a simple reference to his personal ideological  
programme implies. An ideological definition of liberalism is in fact quite  
difficult in this context. In nineteenth-century Germany, the term “liberal”  
encompassed a spectrum of opinions ranging from laissez-faire to  
protectionist in the economic sphere, Lutheran to atheist in religious matters,  
and libertarian to statist in the realm of politics. 15  Part of the aim of this  
study is to demonstrate how liberalism embraced many shades of opinion,  
while remaining a movement in which Virchow’s programme could still find  
deep resonance. By stepping into practical activity, Virchow donned the  
mantle of scientific social reform and became subject to its inherent tensions.  
This argument and the method it entails will, I hope, avoid an overreliance  
on Virchow’s personal beliefs and accomplishments in explaining his career. 
By placing him within the company of other liberals in Germany, and in  
particular of those who helped define the nature of liberal politics through  
their reformist undertakings, I want to suggest that Virchow’s exceptionalism  
did not so much make him an anomaly in the world of Bismarckian  
Realpolitik as it attested to the vitality of certain elements within German  
liberalism. There is only so much that one man’s life can tell us about the  
group to which he belongs, but in conclusion I situate Virchow’s liberal  
reformism in the context of his contemporaries, suggesting that his vitality  
argues for a more complex approach to a movement whose political failure  
has been overdrawn and somewhat unfairly portrayed in the historical  
literature. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Virchow’s Revolutionary Years, 1848-49: 
Medicine and Politics as Liberal Social Science 
 
 
A life full of work and toil is not a burden but a blessing … It is by incessant work  
that we learn about real life; it is thus that we gather over the years a far richer  
store of experiences and draw on deep, unfathomable treasures of wisdom accessible  
only to the initiated and not to lazy and idle persons given to rest and ease16 
 
A seventeen-year-old Virchow wrote these words in his 1839 graduation 
examination from the Köslin Gymnasium in his native Pomerania, now  
part of northwestern Poland. The next decade of his life bore concrete  
witness to Virchow’s belief in work and toil as the privilege of an enlightened, 
“initiated” élite. His first love would always be medicine, and later in 1839  
he embraced the “blessing” that a difficult medical career had to offer. On 
scholarship to the Friedrich-Wilhelm-Institut in Berlin, established in 1795  
to train gifted young men to become army doctors, Virchow’s work and  
toil was at first very unexceptional for a student in his position. He constantly 
worried about finances; he struggled to overcome the chaos and indiscipline  
of medical education at the time, unlike some students whose main interests  
were “skipping lessons, playing cards [and] drinking beer”; and he bemoaned  
the poor socio-economic status of doctors, complaining that railroad workers  
could earn as much in a day as doctors did in a month. Finally, he had to  
deal with the strictly medical cares thrust upon him as a would-be physician, 
which included such activities as “the administration of laxatives, sleeping 
powders [and] toothache pills” as well as the occasional blood-letting and 
application of leeches. In 1846, Virchow completed his last state medical 
examinations, began giving lectures in pathological anatomy (a science he  
later revolutionized), and embarked on the practice of medicine as a fully- 
fledged physician. 17 
Virchow’s initiation into the world of medicine coincided with a developing 
interest in a second realm, that of politics. By the late 1840s he was writing  
to his father of the “violent” debates in the Prussian parliament and the  
decline of the government’s legitimacy. Of particular importance in the  
“hungry forties” was the so-called social question. This issue, regarding 
what should be done to check the moral and material decline of the country’s 
lower classes, was a matter of increasing political concern for the German 
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educated public. Virchow noted that in such circumstances “a harvest too  
can be a political event”, and expressed a special interest in observing the  
typhus epidemic in Upper Silesia, in which the Silesians’ poverty  
and destitution had been implicated. Virchow would eventually combine  
his twin interests in medicine and politics in investigating this “scandal that  
has become full-blown by the death of thousands”. 18  For the time being,  
however, he continued to view political events from the “domestic” confines  
of the Charité, Berlin’s largest hospital, which he likened to a “town of its  
own”, isolated from the outside world . 19 
Virchow’s work brought him in contact with patients whose physical  
ailments paralleled the material and psychological suffering that  
characterized the lower classes as a whole, a fact that constrained him to 
view the social question through the prism of personal medical experience. 
In 1843 he wrote to his father of the stench and dirt and high temperatures  
in the scabies wards, whose inmates came from the “most depraved level  
of society”. He also described insane patients in whose hearts “distrust and 
suspicion reign supreme”, and who exhibited religious mysticism and a 
predilection for masturbation. 20  Virchow’s attitude toward these people  
mixed sympathy and disgust. On the one hand he likened himself to a  
“jailer” of the human wrecks who wound up in the Charité. On the other,  
he thoroughly enjoyed his work and commented that it “makes both me  
and my patients happy, for my nurse constantly assures me that I am much  
too good to them”.21 Above all, Virchow saw these people through the eyes  
of a doctor. Though the discipline of medicine at that time did not enjoy  
the heroic mystique that it does today, it none the less conferred on its  
practitioners the unique opportunity to mingle among the afflicted without  
joining them, to practise charity and administer healing from a comfortable 
professional distance. Virchow’s remarks on this subject reveal a kernel of  
human compassion with a thick coating of scientific objectivity. He  
remarked clinically but tellingly that his medical experiences had introduced  
him to “the most interesting personalities”, and that through them, “one’s 
knowledge of human nature is greatly enriched”. 22 
This blend of compassion and distance would come to characterize  
Virchow’s medical politics as a whole, but it took the experiences of the 
revolutionary years 1848-49 to channel these inklings of social concern into  
a coherent ideology. During this period, Virchow’s ethic of work and toil  
found expression in a realm beyond personal cultivation, inspiring a political 
crusade through which he honed a liberal approach to the social question.  
This chapter aims to demonstrate how Virchow applied his newly acquired 
“treasures” of medical wisdom to social politics, which subjected him to  
the logic of the liberal social scientist. Though it would be going too far to  
single out Virchow’s medical experience as the sole determinant of his  
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peculiarly liberal beliefs, there is nonetheless a firm connection between  
his professionalized compassion in the medical realm, and his paternalistic 
ideology in the political realm. Medical practice combined social distance  
with fraternal humanism in the relation of doctor to patient, and to  
Virchow this relationship paralleled that between liberal social scientists  
and the suffering masses. From his superior vantage point, he strove to heal  
the people by elevating them to a social and political level he deemed  
“healthy”. The strategy of co-opting the disenfranchised into a stable order  
based on equal rights, education, rule of law, democracy, personal freedom  
and scientific rationality formed the outlines of Virchow’s social politics. To 
achieve these aims would entail a social revolution, but one whose explosive 
potential must be moderated by a reformist élite exercising its power through  
a benevolent state.  
 
The lineaments of the liberal social scientist: 
Virchow in Upper Silesia 
 
Virchow’s liberal ideology of social politics was crystallized by his 
observation of the Upper Silesian typhus epidemic. By all accounts, the 
experience fundamentally changed his life, stirring in him an appreciation  
for the social and political causes of disease. Sent by the Prussian Minister  
of Culture to report on the medical conditions of the epidemic, Virchow  
arrived in the Silesian village of Sohrau, in what is today south-eastern  
Poland, on 24 February 1848.23  His first impression of the area was not of  
any particular medical condition, but rather of the general debasement of  
the population, which had rendered it susceptible to epidemic onslaughts.  
Virchow wrote evocatively of the Silesians’ poverty, describing the shabbiness  
of their living arrangements, their poor eating habits, and their utter lack  
of hygiene. Plagued by “vermin” and lice, the Upper Silesian “leaves it to  
celestial providence to free his body occasionally by a heavy shower of rain  
from the crusts of dirt accumulated on it”. 24  The “slavish and submissive” 
Silesians cared more for brandy and sexual licentiousness than discipline  
and hard work, in Virchow’s opinion. They had no conception of private  
property and no concern for thrift or planning ahead, nor did they have a  
strong family structure. Their “canine subservience” and utter contempt  
for middle-class values reinforced Virchow’s belief that only “a free man  
accustomed to work” could serve as a model citizen, and that such a man,  
on viewing the Silesian people, could not help but “feel disgust rather than  
pi t y ” .25 
Despite the vehemence of his revulsion, Virchow strove to understand  
and characterize the Silesians in more scientific terms as well, attempting to 
acquire the professional distance necessary for a more objective analysis.  
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His meticulous description of their living quarters informs us that the  
dimensions of a typical house were 8 to 12 feet (2.4 to 3.7 metres) square  
and 5 to 6 feet (1.5 to 1.8 metres) high, and that from 1834 to 1847, the  
average number of inhabitants per house increased from 7.5 to 9.5. 26  More 
importantly, Virchow determined to ferret out the medical causes of the  
epidemic with rigorous scientific methods. Through case studies as well as 
statistical evidence he explored in excruciating detail the urinary and fecal 
discharges, dermatological eruptions, and pained respirations of typhus  
patients. His clinical descriptions in the meaty middle section of the report  
stand in marked contrast to the excited outbursts of the beginning .27 
Virchow evaluated these empirical findings in light of contemporary  
theories on contagion and infection, the influence of climate and geography,  
the distinction between typhus and typhoid, and the role of “miasmas”  
and decaying vegetation in the etiology of the epidemic. His conclusion  
emphasized a miasma which he took to be the endemic cause of the disease  
and that stemmed mainly from factors like “chemical decomposition” as  
well as moisture and other weather conditions. He explicitly denied any 
monocausal connection between typhus and the poor housing conditions  
in Silesia, starvation or poor diet, or bad hygiene, but made room for the  
possibility that social circumstances could be contributory factors. Famine,  
for instance, “might have increased the predisposition for the disease”;  
and the “unwholesome circumstances” connected with the Silesians’ living 
conditions could have produced that crucial, marginal difference in  
susceptibility that transformed an endemic miasma into a disease of epidemic 
proportions. This is what Virchow meant when he wrote that “we have  
always felt obliged to seek the cause of an epidemic in … an intensification  
of domestic insalubrity”. 28 
This conclusion gave Virchow the opportunity to analyse the social 
determinants of disease in more detail than the simple descriptions of  
“domestic insalubrity” entailed. By upholding such social determinants as  
valid scientific cofactors in disease etiology, Virchow sought to transform  
his impressionistic criticisms of the Silesian population into more precise  
(but hardly less polemical) formulations of social underdevelopment. In so 
framing his ideas, he applied his professional perspective to a far-reaching 
solution of the social questions bedeviling Silesia, and styled himself the 
physician-reformer diagnosing society’s ills.  
The first social factor he isolated concerned the withering of ethnic identity 
among the population. Silesia, he explained, had been severed from the  
mother Poland for over 700 years, and while the Lower Silesians had been  
almost completely Germanized, the Upper Silesians had retained Polish  
customs and language and thus remained outsiders when Prussia obtained  
control over the region. The result was a population adrift, with no Polish  
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role models and no national consciousness, and therefore “in a dreadful  
way … no development and no culture”.29 To the extent that Polish influences 
remained in Silesia, their effect was primarily negative. Virchow cited here  
the pernicious tenacity of the Catholic religion among the Silesians, showing  
an anticlerical streak that would later mark his behaviour during the  
Kulturkampf. He derided the parish priest, whom he labeled the “absolute  
master” of his congregation, and alleged that the Catholic hierarchy, in  
order to maintain its power, sought “to keep the people bigoted, stupid,  
and dependent”. Catholic charity during the epidemic he regarded as erratic, 
poorly coordinated, and concerned with “individual patients only, and not  
the epidemic as a whole”. To a thoroughly secular man like Virchow,  
Catholicism could not help but induce submissiveness, fatalism,  
obscurantism and “mental bondage” in its adherents, at the same time as  
it failed its Christian calling to succour its flock.30 
Economically, the Silesians remained mired in the Polish institution of 
“robotage” or quasi-serfdom. The rendering of five to six days service per  
week by robots sapped them of the individual initiative and personal zest 
necessary to vitalize the economy, improve social conditions, and reduce  
the population’s proclivity towards disease. Moreover, the stratified nature  
of Upper Silesian society distanced the classes from one another and  
prevented any meaningful cooperation between them. Echoing Marx,  
Virchow decried the appearance of a “young money aristocracy” that had 
abandoned its traditional duties towards the populace. There existed a  
dearth of leading citizens and educated men to harness the potential of the  
Silesian people, because in this region the few educated people there were  
had become acclimatized to the suffering around them. Many proposals for 
sickness relief, Virchow noted, generated “a general complaint that the  
people would be spoilt”. The absence of a dedicated phalanx of socially  
conscious and prosperous citizens meant that for the lower classes, “no one  
was there to act as their friend, their teacher, or their guar dian”.31 
The combination of cultural waywardness, religious oppression, and class 
tension had produced a catastrophe of such proportions, according to  
Virchow, that “never during the 33 years of peace in Germany had even  
remotely similar conditions been seen”. 32  In his mind, the situation called  
for thorough and immediate change. Virchow did not hesitate to pile on  
the most radical prescriptions to cure the Silesians of the deeper social  
factors that had predisposed them to epidemics. He called first of all for  
“full and unlimited democracy”, and in consideration of Silesia’s special  
status, national self-determination and a complete release from Prussian rule. 
These remedies would allow the Silesians to evolve indigenous institutions of 
government at the same time as they joined “the great family of Slav  
peoples”. Nurturing this awakening in the new Silesia would be the liberal  
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triad of wealth, education and freedom, which Virchow regarded as direct  
substitutes for the “hunger, ignorance, and servitude” he found there at the  
time.33 To achieve these liberal ends Virchow admitted the potential necessity  
of violent means. He noted that the powers that be are never willing to  
admit that a people is “ripe” for self-determination, so sometimes the people  
have to take matters into their own hands. Thus, though he deplored the  
rule of “fire and sword”, he believed that in an imperfect world they could  
be the instruments of “a high ethical and human elevation” . 34 
Such a heroic cure brought with it the danger that the patient would  
react violently. Lest the Silesians’ revolutionary fire take on the character  
of a “glowing fanaticism”, Virchow proposed that a concerned body of  
social reformers and “great men of state” involve itself in the elevation  
of the people, channeling their fiery zeal into a “mild but enduring and 
fecundating warmth”. 35  Meritocratically selected and drawn from the  
educated indigenous population, such leaders would lead the people into 
prosperity by means of a “tutelary control”, thus “awakening their dormant 
qualities”. They would replace the oppressive Catholic hierarchy and  
insensitive aristocracy whose anachronistic rule then passed for leadership,  
and constitute the class that would bear the standard of liberty and entice  
the people to share in its advantages. 36  Despite their salutary influence,  
however, these reformers could not in themselves consolidate and manage  
the social revolution that Virchow prescribed. In medicine, the healer can  
rely on biological mechanisms to effect his remedy, but in statecraft, the  
reformer depends on the artificial power of government to implement  
change. A managed social reform in fact demanded a context through which 
democratic institutions and personal liberties could be established and  
protected, and the role of the state in providing this context is the most  
challenging aspect of the Silesian report.  
Not surprisingly, Virchow found the current state apparatus hopelessly 
anachronistic and rooted in the bureaucratic-absolutist traditions of  
mid-nineteenth-century Prussia. He faulted the bureaucracy for being too 
repressive and authoritarian. The paper-pushing officialdom, with its  
deadening centralization, surveillance mentality, and “patronizing and  
artificial formalism” had made a mockery of the famed Prussian civil service. 
Virchow betrayed his utter contempt for the bureaucratic state when he  
wrote to his father that 
 
sum after sum is spent, official follows official, extra posts lie in heaps in the  
fathomless mud of these highways - but the dead do not come back to life, and  
many people will retain the germs of an endless illness … And yet the government  
still does nothing more than send flour and here and there a physician, and use up  
a lot of paper in writing. It is horrible, disgusting . 37 
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The good government, on the other hand, did not demolish bureaucracy  
per se, but rather established it on a more rational footing. A vigorous local  
self-government should replace an administration “estranged from the 
requirements of the people” and guided by rigid ordinances instead of local 
contingencies. In the stimulation of “a common general effort” among the  
people, the ideal government would undertake practical projects, like road-
building, improvement of agriculture and animal husbandry, and regulation  
of industrial competition and exploitation. 38 
The virtue of such a government, and the feature that distinguished it  
from the Prussian ideal of an enlightened but paternalistic bureaucracy,  
would be its collaboration with a coequal, local civil society. In an immature 
society such as Silesia’s, however, only the state itself could provide the  
basis for such a partnership. To cultivate vitality in the social sphere, the  
state must intervene decisively to secure the “unquestionable right to a  
healthy life”. This presumed, first of all, material and moral elevation.  
Through education and the bestowal of rights, the state could make the  
people “not only externally free but even more so internally”.39 But Virchow 
doubted that “constitutionalism” and schooling alone could effect the  
changes he required. He criticized the “absurd concentration of capital and  
landed property” in the hands of a few individuals, and thus advocated 
associations of the unpropertied as counterweights to the privileges of  
capital, maintaining that a more equitable distribution of wealth was “the  
sole means of improving the social condition”. Importantly, however, he  
rejected large-scale state employment of labour as a “new factor in the  
subjugation and dependence of the individual”. A lively associational life,  
an interplay of the interests of capital and the interests of labour: these 
recommendations seemed more democratic than any socialistic enterprise  
the state might undertake.40 Virchow’s liberal philosophy thus specified clear 
limits on the extension of state power - even when such power was aimed  
at securing the very ideals of liberalism itself.  
Virchow’s ambivalence about state intervention is clearest in his advocacy  
of public health reform. Owing to his medical outlook, he regarded such  
reform as the centrepiece of any programme of social politics. Again  
criticizing the status quo, Virchow found state physicians to be contemptibly 
ignorant of science and submissive to authority. What was needed was a  
better-trained corps of physician-reformers, acquainted with epidemiological 
principles, who could produce “long, detailed studies of local conditions”  
in their regions. Such studies would serve as the scientific basis for the 
formulation of legislation that would address the public health concerns of  
the nation. 41  To prevent future epidemics, the state must take its cue from  
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medical experts and intervene to protect society. As Virchow diagnosed the 
Silesian case, “with 1.5 million people, palliatives will no longer do. If we  
 
wish to take remedial action we must be radical”. 42  As to the precise  
mechanisms mediating between medical expert knowledge and concrete  
social policy, however, Virchow said nothing. That a scientistic dictatorship  
of medicine could threaten the freedoms and pluralism of democracy was  
not a concern of his – at least not yet. What was important was simply that  
the state should formulate a social policy based on scientific principles.  
Since “medicine has imperceptibly led us into the social field”, it was  
the responsibility of physicians to provide the “theoretical solution” and 
politicians the “actual solution” of social problems. 43  Medicine was central  
to the social question, and therefore had political claims on the state. But  
having drawn the state into the “actual solution”, Virchow went no further  
in articulating its ideal form. In the Silesian report, Virchow simply provided  
the most schematic outlines of a state apparatus designed for radically  
reformist purposes but treading a fine line between bureaucratic paternalism  
and social partnership, state intervention and individual rights, and medical 
knowledge and democratic government. 
 
The 1848 revolution: liberal politics and medical reform 
 
The next fifteen months drew Virchow closer to exact formulations by  
subjecting his ideas to the test of political practice as he participated, as a  
liberal and a physician, in the 1848 revolution. If Virchow developed the  
basic principles of his lifelong political philosophy in the remoteness of 
Upper Silesia, he found in the concentrated excitement of Berlin the active  
give-and-take of public discourse. On 10 March 1848, he hurried back from 
Silesia to the capital, where the next day he found it “highly disturbed”.  
On the 18th, the revolution in Berlin took on a popular character when  
Prussian troops fired two shots into a crowd gathered outside the royal  
palace, sending the mob into a frenzy. In a letter written to his father the  
next day, Virchow described the noise of cannons and the construction of 
barricades that had just begun in the city. By the 24th he declared prematurely  
that “the revolution has achieved a complete victory”. In the early days of  
the upheaval he obtained a pistol and manned the barricade blocking 
Friedrichstraße from Taubenstraße, but never participated in actual fighting. 
Virchow found his greatest political resonance not in revolutionary agitation  
but in the more sedate “medical reform” movement, in which physicians  
capitalized on the charged environment of 1848-9 to advance their most  
ambitious claims for professional improvement in the nineteenth century.  
For a year, the journal that Virchow co-founded, entitled Die medicinische  
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Reform, publicized not only the activities of physicians throughout Germany  
and Europe, but also the contributions that put Virchow at the vanguard  
of the medical reform movement. 44 
The image of a pistol-wielding physician may seem incongruous, but  
Virchow’s activities in the revolution took place against the backdrop of an 
increasing politicization of the medical profession. Virchow shared the  
distinction of having fought at the barricades with Dr Paul Boerner,  
who later edited the influential German Medical Weekly. In 1848, thirteen 
physicians, including the future socialist Johann Jacoby, gained seats in the 
Prussian National Assembly, a body to which Virchow was also elected,  
but from which he was disqualified for being too young. 45  Inclinations  
towards political activism infected entire organizations. The General  
Assembly of Berlin Doctors was formed on 2 April 1848 to pursue matters  
of professional interest, but inevitably succumbed to an atmosphere in  
which “the flurry of political events, the elections, the feverish excitement  
in Berlin pushed special interests into the background”. 46  Energized by its 
younger and more politicized members - Virchow, for example, was the 
assembly’s vice-president - the organization illustrated a new trend in  
doctors’ professional representation, away from specialized and largely  
apolitical societies such as the Association for Scientific Medicine (itself  
founded only in 1844), and towards an organizational form expressing  
physicians’ interests in explicitly political terms. 47  All over Germany - in  
Saxony, Silesia, Westphalia, Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria, East Prussia  
and especially in Berlin - the 1848 revolution saw the founding of medical 
societies whose particular professional ambitions were subsumed in the  
broader rhetoric of the revolution.48  As Dr E A Steudel put it, the ideas of  
the medical reformers “have a connection with the general ideas of the time 
… Therefore it is my sincere belief that a reform of our health care system  
that only concerns doctors will necessarily be insufficient”.49 
The equation between professional self-interest and the universalist  
discourse of 1848-9 did not strike the medical reformers as problematic.  
Political doctors did not believe that their particular grievances lay outside  
the problems of the political system at large. Rather, because they regarded 
themselves as especially oppressed by the current social order, doctors felt 
uniquely positioned to benefit from its reconstruction. As one physician put  
it, “in the medical profession are united the noblest achievements of which  
man is capable, and the most unworthy conditions which can be found”. 50  
The political awareness of physicians derived largely from a material and  
moral crisis in the profession during the mid-nineteenth century. Doctors  
at that time earned about as much as launderers, dressmakers, and butchers,  
and (as Virchow himself noted) considerably less than railroad workers.  
Increasing competition only heightened this material hardship. In the  
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countryside, university-educated physicians had to contend with quacks and 
“natural healers”, while in the city, which absorbed most of the 37 per cent 
 increase in the number of doctors from 1825 to 1840, intra-professional 
competition centred on the limited market of patients sophisticated  
enough to consult trained physicians. 51  Add to this the pathetic reputation  
of medical science itself, plus the resentment of untrained interlopers that  
this entailed,52  and the circumstances become ripe for a bid among doctors  
to use politics to ameliorate their collective condition.  
The medical reformers - with Virchow usually at their forefront - saw a 
solution in the liberal politics of the revolution. In its campaign for liberty  
and against a repressive state, liberalism offered an emancipation from 
meddlesome restrictions that hampered professional freedom and its natural 
concomitant, material prosperity. The first objective of the reformers was  
therefore to abolish anachronistic holdovers in the regulation of the medical 
profession in Germany. The use of Latin, the absence of an all-German 
pharmacopoeia, and (in Bavaria) the right of communities to veto the  
marriages of their community doctors53 were just a few of the most superficial 
legacies of an outdated organization of medicine that had continued into the 
mid-nineteenth century. More substantially, the state interfered in physicians’  
lives by subjecting them to the same type of police surveillance with which  
it governed many other segments of society. A certain Dr Riedel wrote an  
article for Die medicinische Reform complaining that one night he had been 
awakened by a patient whose ailment the doctor judged to be minor. When  
he bade the patient to come back later, Riedel suffered a “very energetic 
reprimand” from the local police officer, who enjoined him to fulfil his  
medical duties according to state regulations. Riedel’s protest against the  
“policed enslavement” of the medical profession was one instance of a general 
resentment among doctors against state interference in their activities. 54 
Another type of interference took the form of the regulations and edicts  
that perpetuated a peculiar division of the medical profession into different 
spheres of practice. Each German state had its own scheme for classifying 
different types of healers. Württemberg, for example, distinguished among  
ten different classes of physicians. The Prussian government, acting on its  
own initiative in 1825, reduced the number of categories from seven to  
three, but maintained what the medical reformers regarded as an artificial 
distinction between “graduated” (university-trained) doctors, practicing  
mainly internal medicine, and two types of surgeons, who were substantially  
less educated. 55  In addition to upholding the indivisibility of medicine on 
scientific grounds, doctors demanded an all-encompassing and united  
medical profession for economic and political reasons. Obtaining permission  
to practise more than one type of healing - adding surgery and midwifery  
to internal medicine, for example - permitted doctors to cope more flexibly  
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with increased competition.56 A unified profession would also put physicians  
in a better bargaining position with the state, allowing the best trained and  
 
most prestigious doctors to assert their influence over branches of medicine  
from which they had been legally excluded before.57 
 The demand by doctors that the state bow out of meddlesome restrictions  
could sometimes take on strange twists, as evidenced by their attitudes  
toward quackery. Though not completely united on this issue, the great  
majority of medical reformers advocated that regulations outlawing  
quackery be abolished, thus foregoing the protection offered by the state  
in regulating medical practice. One explanation for this counterintuitive  
position was that quackery laws simply did not work. Dr F Loffler regarded 
current legal protections against charlatanism as weakly enforced and  
“illusory”, likening the belief that the state could stamp out all instances of 
quackery to the idea that doctors could cure every patient.58 Virchow’s more 
explicitly liberal argument represented the dominant strain of opinion. He 
advocated the abrogation of quackery laws as a logical consequence of the 
economic freedoms of the modern world, maintaining that education of the  
people and the scientific progress of medicine would naturally lead patients  
to become sufficiently discriminating in their choice of healers. The  
medicalization of the population demanded that state regulations fall away  
as the issue of quackery ceased being a legal matter and became a “purely  
cultural question”. 59 
Having freed doctors from the shackles of state regulation, it would be 
necessary to update the structure of the profession and modernize its  
organization. In an atmosphere of professional deregulation, doctors would  
assert the right to police themselves within a legal framework that substituted  
the liberal demand for economic and trade freedom for the guild-like  
organization of society. Proposals varied about the best way to accomplish  
this goal. On the conservative side, some suggested state-sanctioned  
corporations that would forcibly include all doctors in a given community.  
Many added provisions for disciplinary councils (Ehrengerichte) through  
which physicians could stamp out malpractice in their midst and (in some 
formulations) take over the state’s role in disciplining the “natural healers”  
and other non-physician quacks who threatened mainstream practitioners. 60 
Liberal physicians, with greater confidence in self-regulation, advocated 
independent associations with voluntary membership. 61  The majority of  
doctors in fact supported the free association, a proposal which found favour  
in the Berlin, Merseburg, Anhalt, Silesian, and Saxon assemblies (although 
the Merseburg and Saxon assemblies advocated a hybrid, state-sanctioned 
free association, which they believed none the less addressed the need for 
“self-government of doctors”). 62  Dr Robert Remak maintained that anything  
 23 
 
less than a free association would represent “the most vexatious despotism”,  
while the psychiatrist Rudolf Leubuscher, co-editor of Die medicinische  
Reform with Virchow until 1 January 1849, believed that only through the  
association could the medical community truly come to regard itself as a  
“profession”. 63 
Again, Virchow’s position captured the liberal argument on the institutions  
of the medical profession. Like many other liberals, he regarded the free 
association as the “idea of our time” and as a general model for social  
organization. In the context of medical reform, he believed that it represented  
a happy medium between interference in the lives of doctors and unrestricted  
competition: 
 
Free competition within the association: this is our professional freedom. Free  
competition outside the association leads to general charlatanism … Association  
without free competition is the enslavement of the individual by the mass .64 
 
Indeed, the association was to Virchow the guarantor of professional  
elevation. It would not only represent the political interests of doctors, but  
also provide material support to needy physicians. Virchow’s endorsement  
of this liberal institution grew out of the necessity of overcoming the  
“material cares and degradation” through the creation of associations 
“guaranteeing freedom, capacity for development, and mutual rights and  
equal it y” . 65 
 
From medical reform to liberal social science 
 
The association was for Virchow the centrepiece of a general professional 
improvement based on liberal principles. But in articulating the reasons  
behind their espousal of liberalism, Virchow and the other medical reformers  
did not focus solely on their own socio-economic elevation. The medical  
reform movement was always one of ideas and idealism, not mere special  
interest politics. Virchow is the clearest example of this. He explained that  
“I am now no longer a half man but a whole man … my medical credo is  
absorbed in my political and social credo”. He regarded medical reform as  
but one “link in a great social reform”, which also embraced freedom of  
speech, press and assembly; separation of church and state; democratic,  
constitutional and representative government; popular education; and a  
hope that every individual would “respect the law … and develop according  
to the gifts which nature has bestowed upon him” . 66 
Other doctors also embraced liberalism as a general political credo. Of  
fifty-five physicians chosen to represent the Charité in Berlin medical  
assemblies, forty-seven identified themselves as “democrats”. In the Prussian 
House of Representatives (1849), which included many physicians, Virchow  
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noted that “not a single doctor subscribed to the programme of the right”.  
He added that doctors’ social conscience frequently put them “at the head  
of the [revolutionary] movement”. 67  For Virchow, these facts proved the  
salutary influence of the medical profession. But in order to justify their  
demands for a liberalization of the profession it was necessary for the  
medical reformers to demonstrate a clearer connection to the universalist  
aims of the revolution than their personal support of liberal values suggested.  
To varying degrees, the medical reformers believed that their potential  
represented the potential of society, and that their occupation should  
therefore serve in some capacity as the sponsor of social improvement. To  
use the terms set forth in the introduction, they styled their profession a  
reformist élite whose occupational liberation would be conducive to the  
common good. 
At the very least this meant explaining why doctors would better perform their 
traditional healing role better in a liberal society. The Berlin General  
Assembly drafted a programme of health care reform claiming the social  
benefits of an empowered profession. During the revolution, the draft noted,  
“the principle of public health care has become ever clearer and sharper … 
We have gradually moved from the particular interests of the profession to  
the universal interests of the people. The goal of our discussions has been  
the modern and democratic organization of public health [in Germany]”.  
The draft made it clear, however, that the prerequisite to a public health  
improvement in the “universal interest” was a thoroughgoing professional  
reform. As “preliminary matters for decision” the assembly identified  
precisely those “particular interests” of the medical community that were 
discussed above. 68  Drafts from medical assemblies in Merseburg, Anhalt,  
Dresden and Silesia (to take just a few examples) similarly conflate social/ 
health politics with medical/professional reform. 69 
Other attempts to cast physicians as a reformist élite were more ambitious, 
extending the sphere of doctors’ competence for sponsoring “reform” beyond  
their traditional role in the individual doctor-patient relationship, and  
placing them nearer the centre of actual political power. Salomon Neumann,  
a Berlin physician and Virchow’s good friend, wrote in 1847 that “medical  
science is in its essence and marrow a social science”, directly anticipating  
the perspective Virchow himself soon developed. By this Neumann meant  
that physicians should expand their usual activities to include the collection  
of social statistics and thereby contribute to the reorientation of politics  
towards the social question. In this endeavour they would enjoy access to  
state institutions, which had a natural and necessary responsibility to  
improve the people’s health. Since health was the sole “property” of the  
poor, Neumann argued, the state must embrace social policies to protect  
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the property rights of its citizens.70 Leubuscher also called medicine a “purely 
social science” and tried to give some “practical content” to this concept.  
In particular, he advocated the “participation of the [state] medical  
 
administration in the worker question” through the regulation of working  
hours, minimum working age, and general working conditions.71 
Neumann and Leubuscher antedated Virchow in connecting medical  
doctors to social politics through the model they provided for social-scientific 
reform. Virchow, however, wished to give the physician-élite its most far- 
reaching powers. In the very first issue of Die medicinische Reform he  
declared that “doctors are the natural advocates of the poor and the social  
question falls to a large extent within their jurisdiction”. 72  In his most  
famous utterance of the period, Virchow extended the ideas of Neumann  
and Leubuscher when he declared that “medicine is a social science, and  
politics is nothing more than medicine on a grand scale”. 73  In its most  
conservative interpretation, this statement merely reflected the principal  
lesson from Upper Silesia: that the political system had an obligation to 
implement the prescriptions of reformist physicians on a societal level in 
determining and eradicating the social cofactors of disease and destitution.  
More provocatively, however, Virchow verged on advocating a benevolent 
dictatorship of the physician-élite. Politics simply was medicine on a grand  
scale, in this conception. Virchow envisioned a progression in German  
political life from “dynastic and territorial” politics up through “national 
democratic politics”, and ultimately to a final stage of “scientific politics”,  
which represented the most “cosmopolitan point of view”, and in which  
the “laws of nature alone determine [our] actions”. 74  A corollary to this  
view was that social disturbances were simply pathologies in the body  
politic, an outlook quite congenial to Virchow, the founder of modern  
pathology. The logical culmination of the Silesian idea was, after all, that  
diseases are “always traceable to defects in society” and that a physically 
unhealthy society suffered from a politically pathological constitution.  
Epidemics are simply “large warning signs from which the statesman can  
clearly read that a disturbance has occurred in the course of his people’s 
development”. 75  Society was the diseased organism, the doctor-statesman  
its healer, and the state the instrument through which he effected his cure. 
This view of medical politics in fact anchored the legitimacy of the state  
to its ability to implement the doctor-statesman’s cure. To Virchow, since  
the state “represents the moral unity” of a group, “when the state allows  
its citizens to be brought into a position in which they must starve to death,  
it ceases legally to be a state”. Under the leadership of the physician-élite,  
it was the “duty” of government to “penetrate all parts of the state with a  
true, real and living spirit”, claiming “any sacrifice” if necessary to cement  
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a “solidarity of obligation” among its citizens in order to administer the  
medical reformers’ social remedies. 76 
This strikingly sinister invocation of state power in a man known for his 
libertarian inclinations reflects the need to transmit medical knowledge  
through organs of government authority. But the ineluctable involvement  
of the state in medical politics was rooted more in the requirements of  
liberal social science than those of a scientistic dictatorship. Virchow made  
it clear that the metaphor of “medicine on a grand scale” was intended  
for distinctly liberal purposes. Medical science, to Virchow, did not seek 
dictatorship; if anything, scientific progress assumed a democratic exchange  
of ideas. A state modelled on this scientific value therefore enshrined freedom 
above all other principles. The social organism did not exact totalitarian  
claims from its constituent cells, because it was not truly an organism  
anyway. Virchow deflated fashionable romantic conceptions of the state  
with hard-nosed materialism when he wrote that “the state is certainly not  
and never will be an organism but a complex of organisms”. Thus, “the so- 
called state organism therefore prospers best when individual development  
is most guaranteed”. 77  Finally, the “pathological society” that Virchow  
mentioned may strike contemporary readers of Foucault as a diabolical  
pretext for the eradication of undesirable (pathological) social elements in  
an attempt to re-establish normality (the opposite of pathology). Virchow,  
however, did not subscribe to this sort of dualistic thinking. To him, a social 
“pathology” merely indicated the locus for benevolent intervention restoring 
diseased elements to their naturally healthy state: 
 
We consider disease not as something personal and special but only a manifestation  
of life under modified conditions operating according to the same laws as apply to  
the living body at all times … Every widespread disease in the nation, be it mental  
or physical, therefore shows us the life of the population under abnormal conditions  
and all we need to do is to recognize this abnormality and signal it to the statesman  
so he can dispose of it .78 
 
In renouncing a medical politics centred on a scientistic dictatorship, Virchow 
articulated how medicine could best take its place in the administration of  
the liberal state. Despite the radicalism of his claims for physicians and  
state power, what Virchow envisioned in their relationship was simply a  
fruitful cooperation between independently constituted organs of power. 79  
Having advocated the free association as the vehicle for professional  
consolidation, Virchow outlined the terms of its position in a liberal  
government: “the position that physicians will occupy in the future in  
relation to the state will essentially depend on the attitude that the state  
will assume with regard to physicians. As long as states continue to exist it  
will be their duty to manage public health”. In fulfilment of this duty,  
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Virchow continued, the state had to match the “claims” of the individual  
in matters of public health with the capabilities of the medical profession.80 
The ideal liberal partnership between the government and doctors is  
clearest in Virchow’s remarks on the charity physicians, a group of doctors 
traditionally obligated to render services to non-paying patients. Jurisdiction  
over charity physicians fell not to the state government, but rather to local 
government, whose dedication to an efficient administration of health care  
for the poor was often suspect. Virchow deplored in particular the common 
practice by which the poor were forcibly matched with certain doctors,  
thereby eliminating any sort of choice between physician and patient. He  
appealed to the necessity of a freely given trust between doctor and patient,  
and to the natural right that a patient had to determine the treatment of  
his own person, as compelling arguments for a reform of the system of  
charity health care. This was especially necessary in light of the great social 
impact of the charity physician; following Neumann, Virchow emphasized  
that medical intervention in the lives of the poor was the surest and most  
concrete application of a truly social medicine and therefore the fulcrum of 
medical politics. He argued that as a result of the inadequate system of  
charity health care, epidemic diseases and general poverty had increased,  
and therefore that medical care must be provided to “free the poor from  
their extraordinary position”. To improve the current system, Virchow  
advocated the formation of associations of doctors to provide charity  
work, associations whose structure would resemble the free associations he 
favoured for representing the profession as a whole. He specified that such 
associations of charity physicians could contract with local communities  
for fee-for-service compensation, and therefore provide a large pool of  
steadily and decently paid doctors from which poor patients could choose  
their favourite. 81  In this plan, Virchow articulated the mechanisms that 
mediated between associations of doctors, local government, and needy  
patients; he therefore satisfied the criteria he had himself set forth regarding  
the participation of the profession in matters of government .  
Delineating a partnership between state and profession was less successful  
on a higher level of government. The most fundamental demand of  
Virchow and the other medical reformers was the convention of a special  
congress to debate and draft changes in the medical constitutions  
(Medizinalverfassungen) of the various German states in an attempt to  
solidify the various and specific aspects of medical reform. Demands for a 
medical congress, along with those for a national public health office and  
an academy of medicine, 82  demonstrated that the medical reformers did not  
want merely the resolution of this or that grievance, but an institutionalized 
partnership with the state in the formulation of medical legislation. Such  
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concrete legislation was necessary to prevent the “arbitrariness” with which 
medical affairs had been administered up to that time, but proposals for a  
congress also made it clear that its purpose was to “involve itself in the  
defence of the health of citizens” and therefore that it “had a special bearing  
on the social question”.83 Throughout the rest of 1848 and into 1849, various 
assemblies made repeated requests of Prussian officials to convene a congress  
to draft a medical constitution, but specifics on its competence were  
never forthcoming. The medical reformers never agreed on whether the 
recommendations of the congress would be legally binding, whether they  
would be subject to a parliamentary vote, or whether the congress would have 
merely consultative powers. Virchow vacillated on this issue in advocating a  
“free congress, neither patronizing nor patronized” in its relations with the  
state. In any case, he added, it was necessary to answer “the general question 
concerning the proper way the democratic state should recognize [medical] 
legislation” prepared by “free” institutions such as the medical congress. 84 
 The main reason that the issues of competence never proceeded beyond  
this abstract level was that negotiations never reached that stage with the  
state authorities. The questions of competence raised by the empowerment  
of a medical consultative body in a liberal-democratic state simply did not  
matter when such a state did not yet exist. Instead there was an illiberal 
bureaucracy with little concern for such questions. The Minister of Culture,  
to whom proposals for a medical congress were sent, repeatedly tried to  
steer discussions away from such questions and into more specific and less  
far-reaching demands of the medical community. 85  Doctors’ concerns to  
establish the competence of a medical congress for the purpose of drafting 
legislation simply fell on deaf ears in a state which the revolution had failed  
to recast along liberal lines.  
 
The decline of the medical reform movement 
 
To speak of a decline in the medical reform movement is in a sense splitting 
hairs, because from its inception the movement never enjoyed that much 
popularity anyway. None the less the spirit that had animated the early  
meetings of the Berlin General Assembly and the first issues of Die  
medicinische Reform in Spring 1848 was noticeably missing by early 1849.  
The earliest symptom of this was internal dissension. Though the first  
meetings of the assembly had attracted up to 300 doctors, or two-thirds of  
the medical practitioners in the capital, 86  the organization was plagued by  
frequent turnover in leadership and controversy over the admission of  
surgeons, who, it will be recalled, were not on a legal par with licensed  
internists. At Virchow’s insistence the assembly ultimately voted to include  
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both classes of surgeons on 11 August 1848,87 but not before a smaller, rival 
organization, the Association of Doctors and Surgeons, had succeeded in  
stealing some of the assembly’s momentum. The pages of Die medicinische 
Reform in early 1849 reveal increasing difficulties in attracting committed 
adherents to the movement and staving off demoralization as the reaction  
against the revolution set in. On 1 January 1849, Leubuscher resigned as  
co-editor of the journal (though he continued to contribute articles), leaving 
Virchow in sole charge. Six months after its first number, Virchow noted, the 
“powerful forces” of the counter-revolution were threatening the “rational 
development of our societal conditions and necessary reform of public  
health that goes along with this”. 88 
This diagnosis was confirmed on 16 March 1849, when the General  
Assembly received a decisive rebuff from the Prussian Minister of Culture,  
to whom it had directed its proposal for a medical congress on 26 February.  
In polite bureaucratic language, the Minister’s deputy expressed his  
appreciation for the assembly’s proposal and that he would take it under 
consideration, but added that he could not give them any definite reply at  
that time.89 This merely confirmed what everyone knew, which was that the 
Prussian state was not about to bow to the demands of a group of radical  
doctors. A weakened General Assembly continued for several weeks to hold  
out in the faint hope that the government would convene the congress,  
but Virchow’s pronouncements on the subject reveal a distinct tone of 
resignation.90  Still, he determined to go down with the ship. On 23 March  
1849 he succeeded to the presidency of the assembly, but that same day saw  
a lively debate on whether the “weakly attended” meeting should dissolve  
itself completely. 91  In June Virchow published an article symbolically  
“handing over” the “dreams” of medical reform to a “younger generation of 
doctors, who still have a future, who believe in culture and its realization”.92 
 On 29 June, Die medicinische Reform published its fifty-second and final 
number, signalling the end of medical reform (at least in Berlin) as an  
oppositional political movement directed against the Prussian government. 
Virchow had been drummed out of his apartment next to the Charité on 1  
May, and faced suspension from his post at the hospital. Fortunately, he  
had accepted an appointment in Würzburg, Bavaria, that allowed him to  
continue his medical and scientific activities on the condition that he not  
make his position “a playground for radical tendencies”. Considering that  
many of his comrades in the medical reform movement faced jail sentences,  
this stipulation seems quite mild. Virchow’s Würzburg years witnessed his  
most intense scientific activity, including the formulation of his principles  
of pathological anatomy. Politically, however, he had been silenced, as he 
pragmatically accepted the necessity of replacing his democratic agitation  
with a dedication to the “inner life [of] the family” and the “silent  
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achievements of daily work”.93 Only in 1859, with his election to the Berlin  
city council, would he rejoin political life.  
The collapse of the medical reform movement grew out of its inability to 
marshal any sort of popular resonance in support of its cause. Just five  
months into the revolution, at the end of July 1849, Leubuscher bemoaned  
that “our infinitely rich and beautiful task, to participate in the unfolding  
history of a society in formation”, had dissolved into debates on  
“trivialites”. 94  Virchow attributed this floundering to the failure of a truly 
revolutionary upheaval to lend backbone to the movement, complaining  
that “the mass of the people, whose sacrifices we have requested, did not  
rise to the occasion”.95 In reality, however, the medical reformers had never 
sought such sacrifices. As Erwin Ackerknecht writes, the medical reformers  
never bothered to consult their “patients” and therefore failed to engage  
mass support for their cause; medical reform purported to represent the  
“general interest” without in itself being “general”. 96  Virchow himself  
regarded an unpreparedness on the part of liberals and a consequent failure  
to organize as being the decisive factors in depriving the movement of a  
wider backing.97 
To argue, however, that the medical reformers - like other liberal 
revolutionaries of 1848 - failed from a lack of social base, is to belabour  
the obvious. The deeper reason for their failure lies in the predicament of  
the liberal social scientist. The medical reformers’ concern for ensuring the  
firm but peaceful establishment of liberal social principles in fact prevented  
them from relying on the very society they were trying to uplift. Virchow  
followed liberal thinking in his distrust of the “rabble” (Pöbel), which “all  
too often lacks judgement and education”, and whose existence precluded  
“peace and order”. To solve the social question required the “annihilation”  
of the rabble, by “taking it into society”, thereby “letting to take part in the  
civil, legal, and familial rights and pleasures” forming the bases of political 
stability. But in order to “grant [the people] a free development according  
their needs”, it was necessary for them to have a firm tutelary guidance. 98 
 By concentrating so heavily on professional reforms as the substance of  
a broader social regeneration, Virchow and the his colleagues betrayed their 
reliance on an activist élite who would carry this burden of leadership. The  
need for nonsubversive politics demanded a top-down approach to the  
social question, and this in turn required a political context favourable to  
the implementation of their programmes. The medical reformers did not  
like the state in its current incarnation, but they recognized its importance.  
As Virchow put it, “the current political climate is inappropriate” for  
medical reform “because it fails to nurture action and principle. These must  
be regarded as a precondition for the preparation [of medical reforms]”. 99  
In the absence of a political climate that could have provided either the  
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social resonance or state structure in which to seriously discuss and  
implement reforms, Virchow and his contemporaries played out a fantasy  
in the realm of ideas. Virchow always ended up drawing in the state, but  
in an era in which the state remained to him a backward and oppressive  
entity, he never got around to articulating the conditions of collaboration  
between social reformers and political authority. The decline of the medical 
reform movement demonstrates just how much Virchow and his colleagues 
operated in an isolated world of political dreams instead of realistic  
proposals, and thus his aspirations were ultimately consigned to irrelevance. 
In the final issue of Die medicinische Reform, Virchow explained how the  
pragmatism he would adopt in Würzburg resulted not merely from his  
political disappointments, but also from the realization that future attempts  
at health reform must be grounded in a practical political context. Rather  
than continue a quixotic campaign, Virchow would devote himself to the  
concrete achievements that his participation in the 1848 revolution had  
failed to provide:  
 
We can only continue to recognize the task of bringing before the people the questions  
of public health, the questions of daily bread and a healthy existence … The medical  
reform that we had in mind was a reform of science and of society. We have  
developed its principles; they will carry on without the continued existence of this  
journal … We are not abandoning the issue, merely the context . 100 
 
The next two chapters will deal with Virchow’s attempts to re-enter politics  
with more realistic aspirations, first in his activities in sanitary reform in  
Berlin, and then in his frustrated attempts at national health care reform.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Virchow and the Canalization of Berlin: 
The Promise of Urban Liberalism 
 
 
The sewage problem in the context of urban liberalism 
 
In 1872 the famous English sanitary reformer Edwin Chadwick described  
Berlin as the foulest-smelling capital city in Europe, and remarked that one could 
recognize a Berliner by the smell of his clothing. Since the beginning  
of the nineteenth century, Berlin had in fact been suffering from the  
inadequacy of its sewer system, which was directly responsible for the state  
of affairs that Chadwick described. Before it acquired a modern system of  
drains, sewer pipes, and treatment centres in the last quarter of the century,  
Berlin relied on an army of workers who carted human waste away from 
residences and usually emptied it into the Spree river at night. The alternative  
to this was simply to leave the sewage in leaky dung pits for much less  
frequent and regular cleaning. In Berlin, “ladies of night-work” referred  
not to prostitutes but to women who piled buckets of excrement into open  
wagons that would be dragged through the streets, leaving behind a foul  
odour which wafted up to the apartments of Berlin’s inhabitants. At eleven  
at night, when the stench became overbearing, the Berliners closed their 
w ind o w s .101 
 To handle other kinds of solid and liquid waste - runoffs after rain or  
snowstorms, factory discharges, kitchen slops - Berlin had a network of  
gutters that ran along the sides of roads. It was not uncommon to find  
human waste contaminating these open troughs. As Berlin became more  
densely populated and its wastewater production increased, the gutters had  
to be widened and deepened to such an extent that they became a health  
hazard for those pedestrians whose feet accidentally slipped into the muck.  
In order to avoid this sort of occurrence, many residents wore boots even  
in the summer. The city did have a primitive system of canals as well as 
underground pipes to collect the gutter waste and eventually channel it into  
the Spree, but this system was hardly comprehensive. The water that did  
make it into the river polluted it, of course, a problem further complicated  
by the slow movement of the Spree’s waters. 
 Between early 1870s, when the sewage problem reached its peak, and  
the 1890s, Berlin underwent a radical change. Beginning in 1873 and  
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extending over the next twenty-one years, the city instituted a “canalization” 
system that offered a solution to the twin problems of human waste disposal  
and drainage of incidental and runoff waters. At the same time, the  
system avoided a contamination of the Spree. The project proved extremely 
successful. Having solved its sewage problem later than many other European 
cities - London, Paris, Hamburg and Frankfurt, for example - Berlin had  
the luxury of drawing on their experience, and thus implemented what  
became a model system whose fame spread beyond Europe. A E Silk, a  
British engineer working in Calcutta (whose sanitary problems surely rivalled 
Berlin’s), wrote a report suggesting that Berlin’s system might favourably  
be applied to his city. His conclusion, utterly typical of contemporary  
accounts of Berlin’s canalization, deserves quotation:  
 
As a city, Berlin can be placed in the first rank of capital cities of the world … The  
cleanliness of the streets and the absence of all bad smells in the city are ample  
proofs of the wise and liberal policy adopted by the City Council in the management  
of sanitary affairs.102 
 
This was a far cry from Chadwick’s damning pronouncement . 
In the hagiography of the Berlin sewer system, Virchow’s name ranks  
higher than any other. Isidor Kastan, in his reminiscences of nineteenth- 
century Berlin, praised the “great researcher and man of the people” for  
his “dogged and persistent dedication to this highly regarded project”  
through which he overcame “all the resistance and spiteful attacks” from  
the opponents of the system.103 To a great extent this reputation is deserved. 
Through his scientific expert opinions as well as his political leadership in  
the Berlin city council, Virchow played the pivotal role in the city’s  
canalization. The word “pivotal” is especially appropriate here, because 
characteristically Virchow served as the bridge between the political and  
scientific aspects of the sewerage campaign. He regarded the project as a  
practical application of medical politics, in that it joined detailed technical 
researches with the community’s responsibility to provide a clean and healthy 
environment for its residents. Virchow himself thus donned the cap of  
physician-reformer in his sanitary improvement activity, and collaborated  
with other urban élites - city councilmen, engineers, scientists - in order to  
clean up the city. 
Virchow’s success owed less to his personal leadership than to the context  
in which he operated, however. In the logic of liberal social science, he  
depended on a state, in the form of Berlin municipal government. His  
consistent reliance on the city government will become clear first of all in  
his late appearance in the canalization story - the way had been prepared  
for him before he entered the picture - and also in the literal sense that  
the city employed him to investigate sewerage reform. Most importantly,  
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Virchow’s campaign for sanitary reform took place at a time when city 
governments in Germany were flexing their political muscle. Liberals in 
particular were able to dominate urban politics even while their aspirations  
on the national stage seemed shaky at best. 104  Attracted by traditions of  
local self-government that had been legally enshrined by the so-called Stein 
reforms of 1808, liberals of various stripes took refuge in the city.105 Urban  
liberalism was thus a condominium embracing different colours of political 
opinion, in which Virchow happily played a large part but - as this chapter  
will also suggest - he adjusted his politics to conform to the aspirations of  
the movement as a whole. Civic leaders upheld the liberal ideal of rational  
self-government, which allowed them to claim that their urban autonomy 
represented a beacon of progress in an otherwise backward and meddlesome 
Prussian state. The canalization campaign fought by Virchow and other  
sanitary reformers, characterized by a “fierceness seldom found in such a 
technical matter”, 106  thus lent political meaning to an ostensibly apolitical  
undertaking. Urban liberals sought to prove that their government was the  
better government, and to win esteem both for their cities and their political 
philosophy. 
To legitimate this contention, liberals sought to improve their cities  
through beautification and development projects, but the critical test of  
liberal city government lay in its handling of economic and demographic  
growth.107 As the increase in size and complexity of city life began to present 
problems demanding a social solution, city governments were in fact forced to 
undertake projects in housing reform, poor relief, and sanitation. Sanitation 
reform turned out to be the urban social reformers’ most successful  
accomplishment and, as the largest city in Prussia, Berlin was most in need  
of improvement in this area. Between the years 1822 and 1871 the population  
of Berlin nearly quadrupled, and by 1880 the city counted over a million  
inhabitants. The old system of channeling waste by whatever method into  
the Spree was increasingly intolerable; Virchow reckoned that if all of  
Berlin’s liquid human waste reached the river, 1.04 billion cubic centimetres 
would have been emptied into the waterway daily.108 Crying out for a radical  
remedy, this situation presented urban liberals, and in particular those in  
Berlin, with a tremendous opportunity to remake the city and enhance civic  
pride. Canalization represents their attempt to convert the liabilities of 
demographic explosion into a political vindication of liberal self-government. 
This road was fraught with challenges, however, because the  
unprecedented magnitude of urban problems such as sanitation demanded  
an equally extraordinary response from city administrators. The  
responsibilities of city government remained the same - education, public  
works, fire protection, poor relief, waterworks, and of course sewerage - 
but the approach to these responsibilities became qualitatively different. In 
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problems like sanitation, city governments enlisted the aid of engineers and 
scientists whose expertise was needed to design and implement projects, like 
canalization, on an extraordinary scale. Some viewed the elevation of  
technical and scientific knowledge to prime determinant of public policy as 
an inappropriate leap of faith, given the magnitude of the projects that such 
knowledge informed. This qualm had to be overcome. A second concomitant  
of the extension of government responsibility was an administrative and 
bureaucratic reorganization that challenged the social bases of urban  
liberalism. Specifically, government expansion transformed traditional  
networks of governing notables, who knew one another and who participated  
in government in an amateur capacity, into a more diffuse governing  
class, spread out over a larger city. At the same time it demanded a more 
professional commitment on the part of urban politicians and the hiring of  
outside experts and advisers.109 While the social character of city government 
remained homogeneously bourgeois, 110  the spirit that had knit it together  
seemed in danger. Berlin’s Magistrat, the administrative council standing  
just over the city council, remarked that the multiplication of administrative  
posts and a sprawling governmental apparatus led to a situation that no  
longer reflected the “civic communal spirit” originally inspired by the Stein 
reforms.111  What was needed in the modern age was a redefinition of civic  
spirit that addressed pressing governmental responsibilities while preserving  
the tradition of self-government that Stein had institutionalized. 
The challenges posed by urban growth and the qualitative and quantitative 
expansion of city government did not end there for Berlin. Being a capital  
city, Berlin was subject to two governments - Prussian and local - both of  
which claimed extensive influence over the resolution of the sewage problem. 
The Magistrat remarked that the interference of the king and his government  
in the administration of Berlin had stunted the growth of confident self-
government. Only in the 1840s, according to the Magistrat, did the city  
begin to see itself “not merely as the residence of the king, but also as the 
property of its citizens”.112 Given the relative immaturity of self-government  
in Berlin, jurisdictional struggles between various Prussian ministries and  
the municipal government decisively influenced the history of the city’s  
canalization. Thus, urban liberals faced three challenges in the construction  
of a sewer system for Berlin. In addition to mustering political support for 
Virchow’s claim that sanitation was an integral part of medical politics and  
the responsibility of the state (in its municipal incarnation), the proponents  
of canalization had also to provide a technically, scientifically and  
administratively feasible solution to a qualitatively unprecedented sanitation 
problem, as well as to claim the project as their own. The attempt by Berlin’s  
city government to parlay these challenges into political opportunity will  
be the subject of the following pages.  
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Ineffective solutions from state and local governments 
 
The first initiatives taken to solve the sewage problem in Berlin actually  
came from the Prussian government, not the municipal authorities. In 1842  
the government commissioned expert opinions from August Crelle and  
Joseph Baeyer to suggest possible ways of cleaning up the capital, and while 
these produced few practical results, they reiterated in stark terms the  
necessity of a regular flushing and cleaning of the street gutters. By this  
time, the newly crowned King Frederick William IV had taken a personal  
interest in the sewage question, and in 1852 he began negotiations with two 
English entrepreneurs, Charles Fox and Thomas Crampton, who proposed  
to construct a comprehensive water-supply system for Berlin (which up to  
that time had relied solely upon springs and wells). Such a system would  
satisfy the increasing drinking water needs of the town, but its main objective  
was to allow for a systematic and thorough cleaning of the gutters.113 Soon  
the king decided to turn over responsibility for negotiations to the police 
department, which, importantly, was an organ of the Prussian government.  
The state government had tried to involve the city in the financing of the 
waterworks, but, heavily compromised by its recent expenditures on gas  
and lighting improvements, the city declined the offer.114 Thus it was without  
the cooperation of the city that, in 1852, police chief Hinckeldey concluded  
a contract with the English Waterworks Company, led by Fox and Crampton  
and financed privately as a limited-liability corporation. The waterworks  
began operation in 1856. 
The waterworks did not solve the sewage problem. Following the letter  
of its contract, the English company declined to provide sufficient water to  
clean the entire city. High-handed bureaucratic attempts by Hinckeldey and  
his successor, von Bernuth, to circumvent the company’s contracts and force  
it to provide more water proved ineffective.115 Even where the city was well-
provided, the added water use actually increased the amount of sewage  
being produced in Berlin. Responding to these deficiencies, the state  
government again intervened. 116  In 1860, Prussian Minister for Trade,  
Commerce, and Public Works von der Heydt commissioned Eduard Wiebe  
to lead a fact-finding mission to such cities as London, Paris, Cologne and 
Hamburg to study their sewer systems and suggest more comprehensive  
solutions for Berlin. Wiebe’s proposal, published in 1861, defined the political 
debate on canalization for roughly the next decade. Briefly put, the proposal 
recommended replacing the system of dung pits, cart-removal, and side  
gutters with a network of underground sewers that would collect both  
runoff waters from the streets as well as human waste from water-closets  
(to be constructed). These various waters would be gathered at a point  
northwest of the city, somewhere between Charlottenburg and Spandau,  
where they would be dumped into the river. To be constructed over twenty- 
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two years, the canalization system would cost 13 million marks to build  
and about 90,000 marks a year to operate. 117 
The primary political effect of Wiebe’s publication was to provide a focus  
for debate about which the various interests could situate themselves. The  
most fervent opponents of Wiebe’s plan were the big agriculturalists, who  
saw in the current system of cart-removal the opportunity to obtain valuable 
fertilizer, in the form of human waste, at low cost for their estates.118 Diluting  
this waste with street runoffs in the sewers, and then disposing of the whole  
mess into the Spree, deprived agriculture of this resource. In 1862, the  
famous agricultural chemist Justus von Liebig articulated the scientific 
rationalization behind this view. Liebig not only argued for the beneficial  
and indeed unrivalled quality of human waste as fertilizer, but also warned 
forebodingly of the consequences of neglecting this resource. Essentially,  
Liebig saw in agriculture the foundation of a nation’s economy, and suggested 
that if Germany failed to capitalize on its endowments in this area, it would  
be consigned to an ever-shrinking role in world affairs. Claiming for his  
ideas a provenance dating back to Adam Smith, Liebig sought to steer the 
political economy in a more scientific direction by presenting his  
investigations into agricultural chemistry as the determinants of an  
agronomically-oriented philosophy. 119  In 1872 Liebig declared that since  
human waste had a value “beyond all description”, the canalization of  
Berlin would represent a “calamity” of the highest order .120 
Another group opposed to Wiebe’s project represented not the concerns  
of the countryside, but rather those of the city, and objected to the technical 
complexities and questionable public health benefits inherent in the system.  
For one thing, collecting all waste waters at a point northwest of Berlin  
posed enormous difficulties, especially in removing water all the way from  
the southeast section of town. And as the city expanded radially, the  
collection point would have to be moved further downstream, and the  
network of sewers would have to be extended to points farther southeast. 
Furthermore, even if the English Waterworks Company could be prevailed  
upon to increase its supply of water, the channeled sewage might not be  
diluted sufficiently to render it harmless. Releasing this water into the Spree 
therefore carried dangerous potential, not only for the residents of towns 
downstream, but also for the inhabitants of Berlin itself. A very slow- 
moving river, the Spree was unsuitable for rapidly carting away the large  
volume of waste that would enter the sewage canals, and so some of the  
pollution could possibly linger in the vicinity of Berlin. 121 
 The Wiebe plan crystallized debate on the question “Canalization or  
Cart-Removal?”, but generated an extended political deadlock. In the early  
1860s, the debate had not yet taken on a public character, and remained  
largely confined to government circles. The various arms of the Prussian 
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government took different positions. In 1862 the Royal Technical  
Construction Committee expressed its support for Wiebe, followed in 1868  
by the police department, which was concerned to “defend its jurisdictional 
interests in sanitary matters”. The Agricultural Ministry, for obvious reasons, 
opposed Wiebe. 122  The Berlin city council, whose appointment of a  
commission in 1861 to investigate sewerage reform represented the 
municipality’s first concrete initiative on the subject, was divided and  
irresolute. City engineer Spott was worried about potential cost overruns  
and the technical complexity of Wiebe’s project, and he was joined by  
Thorwirth, who emphasized the possibility of contaminating the Spree and  
the agricultural opportunity costs that Liebig had pointed out. On the other  
side, the engineer Veitmeyer, who had travelled with Wiebe on his fact- 
finding mission, supported the canalization project, as did councilman von  
Unruh, who regarded the “necessity of canalization” as a “question of our  
time”.123 
 The Berlin Magistrat, which by 1866 was tired of five years of foot- 
dragging by the municipal commission, decided to seize the initiative and  
came out in favour of Wiebe’s plan “in principle”, requesting the city council  
to render an opinion on the feasibility of canalization. On 17 November,  
the council declined to make a definitive recommendation, citing the lack of 
technical information on the appropriateness of Wiebe’s plan and specifying a  
list of questions that first must be answered. 124  The council’s vacillation  
reflected the fact that the interests grouped around Wiebe’s plan were not  
yet mature: as long as civic-minded but skeptical supporters of sanitary  
reform were found in the same camp as self-interested agriculturalists, a  
true appraisal of interests could not be made. In an attempt to remedy the  
dearth of adequate information and generate new proposals, the city council  
took matters in hand when in February 1867 it empowered a new commission  
to conduct scientific investigations. Over the next five years the council  
granted it about 120,000 marks for expenses. 125 
 
 
Virchow’s bid for a practical medical politics 
 
Virchow was chosen to lead the commission, and his activities provided  
both the scientific foundation for a more sophisticated canalization plan,  
and gave him a springboard to tout sanitary reform as an application of  
medical politics. The fact that he had previously been appointed to head a 
separate commission by the Prussian Minister von der Heydt (in 1865) 126 
demonstrates that the city’s newfound commitments to finding practical  
solutions to canalization did not represent a simple passing of the torch  
from state to local government. None the less, Virchow conducted his most 
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crucial and detailed scientific researches under the auspices of the municipal 
commission. 
One of the first scientific imperatives was to evaluate the condition of  
Berlin’s groundwater. Ever since the Bavarian scientist Max von Pettenkofer  
had first articulated his influential groundwater theory in 1854, the matter  
had assumed commanding importance in German public health circles. 127 
According to this theory, a fall in the level of groundwater left a layer of 
moistened soil in which infectious diseases, like cholera, could easily flourish.  
It is this half-aerated, half-moistened soil which Pettenkofer regarded as  
most epidemically volatile. 128  As far as the canalization question was  
concerned, this theory had two implications. First, Virchow’s commission  
had to decide whether canalization could possibly moderate dangerous 
fluctuations in groundwater by channeling off excess waters. And second,  
if this were not the case, there arose the reverse question: could seepage  
from canal pipes actually contaminate the soil by releasing harmful human 
excrement into it? With regard to the first issue, the extreme flatness of the  
Berlin countryside rendered impossible any reliance on the natural gradient  
of the land; pipes would have to be laid out along an artificial slope to  
ensure proper drainage. This meant that deep-laid sewers could theoretically  
serve to collect waters from shallower pipes that formed the first order  
of waste water drainage. These shallow pipes could be made porous to  
groundwater through proper selection of building materials. The pressure 
differential between a densely packed surrounding soil and such a drain  
pipe whose density was lowered by the presence of air would ensure that 
groundwater flowed into, and not out of, the pipes. This conclusion laid to  
rest both of the issues raised by the Pettenkofer theory.129 One further logical 
consequence of the groundwater condition in Berlin was not spelled out by  
the General Report produced by Virchow’s commission, but it did have  
practical implications for the canalization plans proposed in Berlin. Wiebe’s 
proposal had relied on an extremely long network of sewers, which made  
it extremely difficult to lay out a system of deep and shallow pipes to provide  
a suitably steep artificial gradient. This obstacle would have to be overcome  
in the final canalization plan.  
From a discussion of groundwater, one of the putative causes of health  
hazards related to the canalization question, Virchow moved to one of the  
alleged effects. This was the issue of mortality due to faults of municipal 
sanitation, and its possible connection to the inadequacies of sewerage. 130  
Through statistical analysis of approximately 350,000 deaths in Berlin,  
Virchow and his commission concluded that general mortality in the city  
had increased fully 82 per cent between 1854 and 1858 and 1864 and 1868. 
Moreover, he noted a rise in mortality in the summer, which time also  
happened to correspond with an increase in the groundwater level. By 
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whatever causal factors - he did not say how Pettenkofer’s theory was  
involved here - it was clear to Virchow that “nothing appears more settled  
than the fact that water level influences mortality”. 131  Upon investigating  
further, Virchow determined that the steep rise in mortality in the summer  
months was due entirely to the premature death of infants: death rates of  
other age categories actually declined in summer. Given that birth rates  
actually decreased in the summer, and given his dismissal of other alternative 
explanations, Virchow could not escape the conclusion that deficiencies in  
air, water or nutrition - in all cases “preventable conditions” - were  
responsible for increased infant mortality, and therefore fell within the scope  
of public health care. In order that his point not be lost on less perceptive  
readers, Virchow cited evidence connecting decreased infant mortality with  
the introduction of comprehensive sanitation and sewerage projects in  
England. 132  This scientific finding significantly furthered the cause of  
canalization advocates in Berlin.  
Virchow did not yet regard canalization as a foregone conclusion, however.  
He continually emphasized that the proper aim of his scientific research  
was to inform public policymaking, not dictate it. As a general principle,  
Virchow rejected premature acceptance of any monocausal account of  
sanitary deficiencies - like Pettenkofer’s groundwater theory - and  
instead advocated a more flexible, empirical approach. For large cities  
especially, the factors affecting health were so complex that adopting  
any particular explanation was an affront to the principles of scientific 
objectivity.133 In this connection, Virchow’s scientific attitude toward Berlin’s 
sanitation problems parallels the approach he took in Upper Silesia, when  
he stressed the social determinants of disease but maintained that climate  
and biology also contributed to the typhus epidemic .  
The specific application of this belief lay in Virchow’s rejection of the 
canalization/removal dichotomy. Ever since Wiebe’s plan, the debate on  
sewerage reform had centred around the issue: should waste, particularly  
human waste, continue to be disposed of by a revamped and systematized  
cart-removal, or should sewers be constructed to solve the problem? Virchow  
had several reasons for opposing such a reductionist approach. For one  
thing, the choice of sewer system depended entirely on the particular  
conditions of the town or city in question.134  Though he maintained that in  
general, canalization was appropriate for cities and removal for towns, the  
Berlin case demonstrated that other factors - the absence of a natural  
gradient, for instance - compelled a detailed consideration of all  
circumstances. But equally noteworthy, even if canalization was right for  
Berlin, the length of time required to construct the system meant that an  
orderly (and improved) removal would have to do for the interim. Therefore,  
“there is no system of canalization that can dispense altogether with  
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removal”.135 To simplify the question by positing canalization as the opposite  
of removal acted as an impediment to scientific debate, according to  
Virchow’s conception. 
Virchow’s endorsement of scientific flexibility inspired a desire to promote  
an active public discourse on sanitary reform. His advocacy of a democratic 
political process and his belief in scientific debate in fact reflected a uniform 
commitment to freedom and pluralism. Virchow commented that each  
conflict of political interests - agriculture versus public health, the taxpayer  
versus the government, the householder versus the police - had a viable  
“standard for judgement” and therefore a place in sewerage reform. Applying  
a dialectical perspective to the democratic process of conflict resolution,  
Virchow maintained that such standards would ultimately produce a 
“reconciliatory viewpoint” that not only revealed the will of the populace,  
but also could “rank among the scientific convictions of the age”.136 Writing  
these words in 1868, Virchow looked on the coming agitation campaign as  
an opportunity to effect a democratic resolution of the canalization question.  
By this time, the discussion of Wiebe’s plan had moved outside purely 
governmental circles and begun to spill over into the public and local  
press. In surveying the political activity up to 1868, Virchow saw in the 
“presentation of facts skilfully and intelligently compiled” a movement  
afoot to divert citizens from a reform of their sewer system. Referring  
to the “agricultural chemists” and “political economists” who opposed 
canalization from agronomical and financial perspectives respectively,  
Virchow derided those who sought to gain political advantage by casting  
the false dichotomy between removal and canalization as a struggle between 
economic prudence and misplaced reformism.137 
Thus convinced of the need for a more rational discourse, Virchow  
hastened to add his own “standard for judgement” to those being offered  
by the opponents of Wiebe’s plan. From the discussion of his liberal  
conception of medical politics in 1848-9, it becomes clear that he did  
not regard his commitment to open dialogue in science and politics as  
incompatible with the firm stance that he himself would take. Here, Virchow 
merely applied his belief that scientific recommendations should have a 
benevolent, guiding role in public policy, not an overwhelming or dictatorial  
one. Virchow’s first aim was to awaken the public to the pressing health  
considerations behind sewerage reform. He described the attitude of most  
of the populace as “indifferent” and “fatalistic”, disinclined to believe that 
sanitary reform could alleviate the depredations of cholera and typhus. 138  
Virchow clearly disagreed with this apathetic attitude, since his investigations  
into infant mortality and groundwater had furnished a clear locus for  
effective and practical intervention. Thus, without committing to the Wiebe  
plan in particular, Virchow maintained that a true sewer system of some  
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sort was necessary to stabilize the groundwater, “for we can do well financially 
and hygienically only by means of systematic canalization”.139 This statement 
demonstrates Virchow’s belief that in the free interplay of interests, the  
public health should none the less assume commanding importance. At  
times he defended this belief on purely ethical grounds, writing at one point  
that health must be the “absolutely deciding factor” in public policy and  
that “whatever the financial consequences, they must be borne when public  
health demands it”. 140  But he also developed a more conservative rationale  
that would appeal to urban sanitary reformers less convinced than he was  
of the inherent value of human life. That is, he added economic justifications  
to ethical ones. He stated that in his hierarchy of political legitimacy,  
“agricultural interests must take second place to municipal economic  
development”, and that this development depended on public health, because  
“state and town acquire their value only through human beings and their work  
... Can there be a greater loss than the loss of human lives?” 141  This  
calculated appeal was designed to demonstrate the viability of a practical  
medical politics, by emphasizing the broad value of his activities on the  
Prussian and municipal commissions. Led by his scientific findings and  
liberal principles, Virchow arrived at a prescription for sanitary reform that  
the government could apply in order to improve the health of its constituents. 
 
Hobrecht’s plan and the agitation campaign 
 
Despite the depth of Virchow’s scientific researches - his commission  
published thirteen volumes (and three appendices) of excruciatingly detailed  
findings 142  - the only canalization plan on the table as late as 1872 was  
Wiebe’s. But in 1869, Virchow’s municipal commission had taken steps to  
offer the city council a more feasible proposal than that which Wiebe had  
been able to offer. On 11 March of that year, the commission hired the  
engineer James Hobrecht to suggest alternatives. 143  More than a simple  
engineer, Hobrecht was an urban liberal reformer in the style of Virchow.  
He had both supervised an urban development plan for Berlin in 1861 and 
designed a canalization system for the city of Stettin. 144  Furthermore,  
Hobrecht embodied the “new man” in urban liberalism at the same time  
as he retained links to the old system of notables. Hired by the city council  
for his technical expertise, Hobrecht is a case study in the professionalization  
of urban politics, but his family connections - his brother, Arthur, became  
mayor of Berlin in 1874 - betokened the lasting importance of personal  
contacts. Author of the plan which would eventually be implemented in Berlin 
and later the director of its implementation, Hobrecht worked alongside  
Virchow in the canalization campaign. Their conceptions of the role of 
government in sanitary reform differed, however; Hobrecht’s more  
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conservative political philosophy demonstrated that urban liberalism was  
not a rigid ideology but a political condominium embracing and supporting  
many shades of opinion. Specifically, Hobrecht was more inclined than  
Virchow to idealize the state (or at least less inclined to specify limits upon  
it). He regarded good health as the “cement” of a “love and loyalty to the  
state” and elided bodily health with the spiritual elevation of society and 
dedication to the state, which he defined as a “community standing for the  
service of an ideal”. To safeguard this ideal, therefore, it became the duty  
of the community to look after the health of its members, through projects  
like sewerage reform.145 
Though sometimes prone to such abstract musings, Hobrecht developed  
an eminently practical canalization plan for Berlin. 146  His critical insight  
and improvement over Wiebe was to split the city into several radial districts,  
like pieces of a pie, and to construct the canal systems serving these districts 
completely independently of one another. Each sewerage network would  
collect all the waste waters of a particular district - mixing street water and 
human waste 147  - and channel them to an irrigation field outside of town,  
where the waste could be treated and then spread over a tract of otherwise  
barren land to be purchased by the city. The system had the virtues of  
cutting down drastically the distance waste had to be carried, because any  
given point would not be unacceptably far from the collection point for the 
district; and it allowed for almost indefinite expansion of the city. More  
branches could always be added to the network, and if necessary, the  
irrigation fields could be relocated further outside of town. Finally,  
Hobrecht’s proposal avoided any sort of contamination of the Spree. These 
advantages succeeded in winning over a large number of civic-minded  
skeptics but could not appease the big agriculturalists. For though the city  
later contracted to some smallholders to farm garden-plots on the newly  
enriched irrigation fields, the waste would still be unavailable for transport  
to the large estates.148 
 The Magistrat received the plan on 1 August 1871 and placed it before  
the city council on 16 November of the next year, advocating the construction  
of Radial System III, which would drain the centre of the city and serve as  
a pilot project to test the feasibility of Hobrecht’s system. The estimated  
costs of this radial system, one among eleven others for the rest of the city,  
would be 6 million marks - nearly half what Wiebe’s entire project had 
envisioned. The details of financing the project were not yet clear, but funds 
would probably come from increases in local taxes and fees. 149  In light of  
the “urgency of the situation”, Virchow and his municipal commission  
endorsed Hobrecht’s proposal even though the commission’s General Report  
had not yet been published.150 With the technical and scientific hurdles thus 
cleared, the project now became the subject of city council discussion. As  
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details of the plan began to leak to the public, the agitation campaign  
described by Virchow reached its most vituperative peak, and finally took  
on the character of a fully public debate. This was because Hobrecht’s 
contribution finally gave competing interests the possibility of sinking their  
teeth into a technically mature sewer system proposal. As Virchow had  
hoped, political discussion began gradually to revolve around the interests  
of the city, so that other concerns were pushed aside. 
This development is clearest in the campaign of the agriculturalists, who  
were naturally the first to heap scorn upon the Hobrecht scheme. In  
November 1872 the German Agricultural Newspaper ran a series of eleven 
articles attacking the plan, but it offered little practical objection to it besides 
reiterating the traditional line that agriculture needed the fertilizer and 
maintaining that canalization would probably not work anyway. 151  
Continuing its criticisms through the winter, the newspaper saw fit to vilify 
Virchow as well. In February 1873 the editorship criticized Virchow’s General 
Report from the municipal commission as “one-sided, superficial, and  
partisan”. 152  Such fervent attacks concealed internal dissension among the  
agriculturalists, however. The Prussian Annals of Agriculture during this  
period maintained its contrasting portrayal of Virchow as a sensible  
moderate, and reported that in 1872 an organization representing estate- 
owners in the vicinity of Berlin had disavowed itself from the tactics of the 
German Agricultural Newspaper, which in their opinion had abandoned its 
“otherwise justified” opposition to canalization in favour of ad hominem  
attacks and other “unworthy means of struggle”. 153  The agriculturalists,  
concerned primarily with their own economic interests, were on the wane  
by 1872-1873 and they seemed to realize this. 
In the meantime, initiative during the agitation campaign had passed to  
the residents of the city themselves. More precisely, the campaign centred  
around the bourgeoisie. Though a few articles appeared in more popular 
newspapers - mainly in favour of canalization, for tenants had little to lose  
in taxes to fund the project 154  - the main participants in the dialogue were 
landlords, pharmacists, doctors, chemists, factory owners, and other middle- 
class citizens. The predominance of bourgeois elements in the canalization 
campaign does not mean that they automatically endorsed Hobrecht’s  
solution. In petitions addressed to the city council, embryonic citizen  
action committees expressed their fears that canalization would “exceed the 
taxpaying abilities of the population” and force landlords to raise rents 
dramatically to cover their costs in taxes. According to the calculations of  
one group, a revamped cart-removal could remove human waste at much  
less cost than canalization (though the group did not say what should be  
done with street and runoff waters). Many of these groups remained sceptical 
about the technical advantages of Hobrecht’s plan, expressing concern that  
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noxious gases from sewer pipes could creep up into houses and cause  
disease. Some cited statistical evidence from England allegedly disproving  
any correlation between canalization and reduced mortality.  
Despite such grave reservations, however, the citizenry was agreed on  
two key points. First, Berlin’s sanitary conditions were in need of radical 
improvement of some kind, whether through canalization or systematized 
removal. Even those who derided the “canalization fanatics” acknowledged  
that their catchphrase, “It cannot remain this way!”, enjoyed a wide  
popularity. Second, the commitment to a solution by the municipality  
ensured that whatever its form, it would appeal to “all those citizens who  
are truly concerned with the well-being of the city and who, in particular,  
want to moderate the effects of ever more threatening epidemics”. 155  In  
short, popular agitation provided the political will to clean up Berlin.  
This popular will found expression in the city council debates of spring  
1873. During March of that year, councilman Beutner spoke for the current  
mood in the city council and echoed Virchow’s rationales for canalization  
when he appealed to the council’s patriotism and “civic spirit” to solve what  
had become a “burning” question. He remarked that the sewerage problem  
had reached a stage where it simply had to be solved, and that the council  
should spare absolutely no means - “no costs, no efforts” - in order to  
relieve the city of its sewage blight. 156  The city council soon validated  
Beutner’s stance, reaching an “essential decision” in favour of canalization  
on 3 March 1873 and then approving the construction of Hobrecht’s Radial 
System III on 15 May of that year. 157  Hobrecht himself would oversee the  
building of his system. 
This final decision to support Hobrecht demonstrates the willingness of  
the council to bow to the decision of the Magistrat despite the reservations  
of the populace. Owing to the structure of Berlin’s municipal government,  
the Magistrat had decisive political leverage in important policy matters.  
The council in fact acted primarily in an advisory capacity, while the  
Magistrat both proposed legislation and reserved the right to sanction or 
disapprove it. Though this arrangement was undemocratic, the members of  
the Magistrat and city council were drawn from the same social groups  
and participated jointly in most important commissions (Virchow’s was  
a “mixed” commission, for instance). 158  Berlin’s Magistrat had favoured 
canalization ever since 1866 as a necessary guard against epidemics, because  
of their “close connection to the groundwater conditions”. 159  In 1873 the  
Magistrat declared its belief that Virchow’s commission had resolved by  
“lengthy and detailed studies of all pertinent questions” any qualms it had  
about Hobrecht’s proposal. Trusting in Virchow’s scientific findings, the 
Magistrat concluded, “the laity has barely any choice but to accept  
[Hobrecht’s] plan”. 160 
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Virchow himself was ambivalent about the Magistrat’s extending such trust  
to nondemocratic commissions like his own. In the Prussian parliament,  
he remarked that placing health policy matters like canalization in the hands  
of “special corporations” prevented any “narrowminded decisions” of fickle 
democratic majorities, but he none the less regarded giving such corporations  
the power to decide on “questions relating to the life and health of city  
residents” as a “dangerous thing”. 161  In this instance, however, he was  
obligated to rely on a context of urban government that sought to implement 
public projects on its own initiative.162 Hobrecht summed up this idea when  
he wrote in 1872 that he longed for a day in which political distractions  
such as the “terrorism” of the agriculturalists would give way to purely  
technical considerations in municipal decision-making on public sanitation.  
The result would be an enlightened leadership of the city government, in  
which “initiative, decision, and responsibility are always left to public 
authorities”.163 In the climate of urban liberalism in Berlin, popular agitation  
thus remained limited to providing the legitimacy for public health reform.  
The canalization campaign had validated Virchow’s application of medical 
politics to sewerage improvement, but the democratic process that Virchow 
envisioned was only partly realized due to zeal of the Magistrat and  
men like Hobrecht in pushing through their own projects.  
 
The consolidation of municipal authority and of urban liberalism 
 
The decision to build Radial System III did not mark the end of the process  
by which city government asserted its control over municipal sanitation.  
In the years 1874-7 the progress of canalization involved the city in  
jurisdictional struggles with the Prussian government. These struggles hinged  
on extremely technical matters, but viewed from a historical perspective,  
they signal the consolidation of the municipality’s bid to wrest control over 
sanitary matters from a state whose intervention it considered both politically 
annoying and administratively inappropriate. 
In 1874 the city began to tackle the question of how to induce homeowners  
to join the canalization system. From a technical and administrative  
standpoint it was necessary that every developed piece of land be  
connected.164  In 1872 Hobrecht counted among those who believed that the  
rates could be structured so as to give a natural incentive to homeowners  
to connect their houses to the system, by making canalization cheaper than  
cart-removal. 165  As building progressed and expenses increased, however, it 
became obvious that in order to avoid huge debt, the city had to exact  
more from its residents. Moreover, since the new system provided new 
advantages over cart-removal - washing out gutters and generally addressing  
the “interest of the community as such” - the municipality considered it  
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“justified” to impose higher tariffs. 166  Sewerage reform differed from most  
other public projects of this era - gas, electricity, waterworks - in that it  
would never become a profitable enterprise, 167  but rather represented one  
of the first incursions of the municipal government into the pocketbooks  
of its citizens in order to promote the general aims of the community. 
As of 1874, however, the city government itself did not have the legal  
power to make such claims, but rather had to rely on the co-operation of  
the police. Virchow bemoaned this circumstance, for he regarded the police  
as “patriarchal” and incompetent in their attempts to govern the city.  
Pointing to their poor handling of the city’s waterworks and their eagerness  
to turn over its finances to a private corporation, Virchow maintained that  
the right of forcing connections to this new canalization must be granted  
to the community itself. Only through a unified, responsible and empowered  
local administration would city officials best be able to represent the interests  
of their general constituency. 168  His hopes for a broad reform in this area  
were disappointed, but in this specific case the city did obtain what it needed. 
After lengthy negotiations with the police, municipal officials hammered out  
two ordinances which required landlords to connect to the system, contributing  
1 per cent per year of the rental value of their properties to the canalization  
fund. 169  Despite their necessary reliance on the police, the municipality did 
succeed in preventing state meddling in the actual financing of the system. 
Hobrecht argued that the city alone should bear the burden of financing  
the system, for despite the potential generosity of state contributions, it  
would put the city in a “more favourable financial situation” if it could  
manage the costs of canalization by itself.170 The huge loans and expenditures 
undertaken by the municipal government over the next twenty years  
demonstrated that this political and administrative control meant a lot to  
Berlin’s officials. According to Virchow’s reckoning, by 1890 the city had  
spent 79 million marks on Hobrecht’s canalization scheme of which 60  
million had been borrowed. 171  Though costly, the decision by the city to  
finance sewerage reform by itself is clear evidence of its commitment to  
local self-government.  
In other matters it was not so simple to reach an accommodation with  
the Prussian government. Due to the historical development of the city,  
many of Berlin’s public squares and streets were owned not by the city but  
by an agency called the Straßenfiskus (literally, “street treasury”). There 
was some confusion as to what this arm of the Prussian government actually  
was; a puzzled Virchow labeled it a “mythical” entity. Such patchwork 
jurisdiction and inefficient organization led inevitably, in Virchow’s opinion,  
to disagreements between city and state governments. 172  In fact, difficulties  
did arise when the city tried to extend the canalization system to those areas  
of Berlin owned by the state. According to Kastan, the Prussian government 
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“did not show the slightest inclination” to remedy the “scandalous conditions  
in its capital” through canalization and balked at the city’s desire to overstep  
its legal jurisdiction.173  Kastan was only partly right; it is more accurate to  
say that some Prussian agencies demonstrated an interest in sewerage reform, 
while others dragged their heels. To the municipal government, it was this 
inconsistency more than anything else that proved that state government  
was ill-constituted to address local needs. By 1875, again after lengthy 
negotiations, the city acquired control over the streets of the town and was  
finally able to install sewers to drain them.  
But only two years later another jurisdictional dispute arose. This time,  
the police, along with the Prussian Ministry for Trade, Commerce, and  
Public Works and the Royal Technical Construction Committee, objected  
to a special feature required in the construction of Radial Systems I and  
II. For technical reasons, these systems required safety outlets to channel  
drain waters into public canals and waterways (under government  
jurisdiction) in the event of heavy rainfall. Hobrecht maintained that  
damming devices existed to prevent the discharge of unclean sewage into  
the waters, but the concerned government ministries none the less asserted  
their right to approve or veto any construction projects that made use of  
the safety outlets. The city objected to such interference, and the Prussian 
government attempted to justify its position by citing complaints about  
pollution by homeowners near the waterways. By 1880, however, the  
complaints had died down and the matter ceased to be an issue.174 
These tiffs reinforced the city administrators’ belief that the only practical  
and advisable implementation of the canalization system lay in a more 
unrestricted administration for the local officials. They proved that the city  
needed to establish a uniform and rational control over all aspects of Berlin’s 
sewer system in order to proceed with its construction and operation  
efficiently. Slowly but surely, Berlin’s municipal government gained the  
control it needed. In 1872 it purchased the city’s waterworks and began  
operating them two years later; in 1875 in took over street-cleaning services  
from the Prussian government (again after much struggle and negotiation);  
and throughout the decade it purchased land from the state and from  
private holders in order to establish the irrigation fields required by  
Hobrecht’s scheme. 175  This consolidation of control vindicated a principle 
Virchow articulated consistently in reference to municipal sanitation. Since  
it was “extraordinarily difficult to establish normative [scientific] principles”  
for sanitation measures that addressed “the very diverse local conditions”  
of each city, the sphere of sanitation and sewage properly lay with the  
community.176 
Fortuitously for the progress of urban liberalism, the technical necessity  
of respecting local conditions enhanced the political ability of the municipal 
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authorities to assert their control over Berlin. In their dealings with the 
government authorities they successfully established the principle that they  
could do the job better than the Prussian administration. More generally,  
the experiences of canalization proved that the coordination of technical  
expertise and efficient administration was best carried out on a municipal  
level. After all, most of the technical and scientific research took place under 
Virchow’s municipal commission, and the building of the system was led  
by Hobrecht and other city employees. Furthermore, the successful sewerage 
reform of Berlin by canalization not only vindicated local government per 
se, but also proved that liberal local government in particular was prepared  
to meet the challenges of urban growth with decisive solutions. To speak  
of sanitary reform in such political terms may sound strange. Virchow  
himself admitted that there was no “liberal” way to clean gutters and empty 
waterclosets. 177  Moreover, until the arrival of the Social Democrats well  
into the last quarter of the nineteenth century, municipal government in  
Germany was ostensibly apolitical: it was part of the ideology of self- 
government that urban liberal politics claimed to represent the general  
interest.178 
Such claims are the surest strength of an ideology, and conceal the  
particular concerns that in fact motivate it. In sewerage reform, urban liberals 
could claim to have improved the living conditions of every inhabitant of  
the city without having sacrificed any of their own power. Canalization  
effected concrete change, and radically transformed the image of the city  
abroad, without any redistribution of wealth among classes or any inordinate 
encroachment on property rights or individual liberties. It also proved that  
reason, in the form of scientific expertise as well as administrative consistency, 
provided the basis of a well-run government. Canalization, therefore, fit 
admirably within the goals and abilities of liberal reformers in Germany,  
and Virchow acknowledged his debt to the governmental context for reform  
that Berlin had offered him. On several occasions he had compromised with  
the condominium of urban liberalism - in his economic justifications for 
canalization, his collaboration with Hobrecht, and his acceptance of the  
Magistrat’s somewhat undemocratic initiative. But in a parliamentary speech  
of 1883 Virchow justified this accommodation: 
 
As a city councilman … I have accomplished many useful and practical things, in  
which on a national level I would have found no support; in part because national  
politics was closed for me, I turned to the municipal community in order to do  
much good. I have found there a forum that pleases me: I have established hospitals,  
built schools, laid out sewers and irrigation fields. I have accomplished a lot of  
useful things, not out of ambition, but rather because they have given me deep  
satisfaction .179 
 
To explain why Virchow did not find the same “support” in national politics  
will be the aim of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Virchow in Parliament: 
The Frustrations of National Health Politics 
 
 
Liberal social science in a conservative state 
 
The story of Virchow’s parliamentary activity in health politics is plagued  
by an annoying gap. On 31 May 1883 the German Reichstag approved  
Europe’s first national sickness insurance law, the earliest in a series of three 
“social insurance” measures inaugurated in the last years of Bismarck’s 
chancellorship (the other two dealt with industrial accidents and old age/ 
disability). By 1885 the sickness insurance funds already covered 10 per 
cent of the population, a proportion that had doubled by 1904. 180  In 1888,  
the funds paid out 61.5 million marks in medical expenses. 181  Sickness  
insurance was in fact the most substantial health programme undertaken  
by the German government in the nineteenth century. One would therefore  
expect Virchow to have been passionately involved in the debate on the  
bill, but in parliament he barely mentioned the subject. Though by 1883 he  
had held his Reichstag seat for three years, Virchow did not once rise to  
discuss the bill’s provisions. During his entire tenure in the Reichstag  
(1880-93) and in the Prussian parliament (1862-1902), he only spoke on  
sickness insurance three times - eight years after the initial bill, at that.182  
We know that he was on hand to vote against the bill in May 1883, but  
the reasons for his silence up until then remain a mystery. 183  Still, it is  
worthwhile to attempt a reconstruction of his views on the subject, because  
the circumstances of Virchow’s non-participation shed light on his broader 
problems in national health care reform. In particular, they reveal the  
reasons that account for his unsuccessful bid for liberal health politics in  
the parliamentary matters in which he did take an active part. This will be  
the main subject of this chapter. 
The sickness insurance law offered much that Virchow could have  
supported.184 It provided for a very decentralized network of local insurance  
funds largely independent from state influence. Both workers and their  
employers contributed to the funds, with the workers contributing twice as  
much as the employers and holding twice as many seats in the funds’  
steering committees. The leadership of the funds was authorized to contract  
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with a body of physicians who would provide medical services for the  
workers. In at least a schematic sense, therefore, the sickness insurance  
funds resembled the medical charity associations Virchow had advocated  
in 1848-9: they ensured local self-government, they administered free care  
to disadvantaged labourers, and they provided a choice among doctors. On  
the other hand, the structure of the funds betrayed its origins in an illiberal 
political philosophy such as Bismarck’s. The law compelled all workers in  
the trades it covered185  to join the sickness funds, in direct contrast to the  
voluntary association that provided so much inspiration for Virchow’s  
politics. In fact, the funds were not so much associational in structure as 
corporatist. Instead of bringing together representatives of a single interest 
- and then pitting this interest against others in a democratic interchange 
- the funds joined employers and workers together in a single organization.  
This arrangement forced cooperation and made workers’ interest in health  
care contingent upon a satisfactory accommodation with their employers.  
Thus despite their numerical predominance in the funds’ leadership, workers 
could easily lose the kind of antagonistic stance necessary in Virchow’s 
conception of pluralistic politics.  
Contemporary German experience proves that the corporatist principle  
of codetermination (Mitbestimmung) is not incompatible with a liberal  
system of government, so this feature of the sickness insurance funds did  
not necessarily represent the kiss of death to Virchow. He may have been  
able to stomach his objections to the funds, in the same way that he  
compromised on certain points in the canalization of Berlin. Thus, what  
made the 1883 sickness insurance law unpalatable for Virchow was most  
likely not its form per se. What made it unacceptable was that its structure  
aimed at stabilizing a conservative political system he deeply distrusted. By 
directing workers’ aspirations into depoliticized corporatist funds, Bismarck  
hoped to prove the state’s interest in their plight without endangering the  
state through their participation in politics. His government had set forth  
this philosophy as early as 1881: “a duty of state-preserving policy should  
be to cultivate the conception - and that, too, amongst the non-propertied  
classes, which form at once the most numerous and the least instructed part  
of the population - that the state is not merely a necessary but a beneficent  
inst itution”. 186 
Contemporary historians have used such pronouncements to attack the 
widespread view of Bismarckian social insurance as “the first all- 
encompassing social policy package in modern society” and the germ of  
the welfare state. 187  Hans-Ulrich Wehler, for instance, has argued that  
Bismarck regarded social insurance as a component of his manipulative  
“carrot-and-stick” policy towards the working classes. To soften the impact  
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of the repressive Anti-Socialist Law of 1878, Bismarck introduced social 
insurance as a “sugar coating” to the “bitter pill” of worker repression. 188  
Other scholars deny Bismarck’s progressivism with less cynical  
interpretations, suggesting simply that he was not really interested in social 
insurance, deriding the true effectiveness of the programmes, and searching  
for precedents in German history that make Bismarck’s conservative coup  
in social legislation seem less revolutionary. 189  Neither school of opinion,  
however, has adequately explored the crucial weakness in the claim that 
Bismarck’s legislation was truly visionary: why did the liberals exert such a 
negligible influence on its passage? If the modern welfare state is based on  
liberal principles - albeit modified from their original, classical form - how  
can such a conservative figure as Bismarck be seen as one of its founders? 
Historians have treated the liberals’ stance on social insurance in an  
essentially dismissive fashion. This is certainly not surprising, because most 
German liberals had very little to contribute to social legislation anyway.  
The moderate National Liberals could claim to have supported the 1883  
bill, but, as Dieter Langewiesche argues, only at the expense of an alliance  
with Bismarck “that verged on illiberalism”. On the other hand, the left- 
wing Progressives - Virchow’s party - opposed sickness insurance, allegedly  
from “Manchesterian liberal blindness” and a belief in “economic  
Darwinism”. In sum, both camps failed to influence social policy because  
“there was no comprehensive political-social reform block in German 
liberalism”. 190  Virchow’s philosophy dictated, however, that political  
liberalism and a social safety-net were in fact complementary. His opposition  
to the conservative rationale inspiring sickness insurance was based on  
subtler objections than most other (leftist) liberals offered.191 
Specifically, the organization of health care in Germany pitted Virchow’s  
liberal social science against an ideology which I will call “conservative state 
interventionism”. The primary aim of this type of statecraft is to enhance  
the prestige and power of the state, and only secondarily to address matters  
of the public interest, such as health care. Sickness insurance, with its statist 
rationale, is but the clearest instance of a more general “state-preserving  
policy”. Since true social reform is not its goal, the state finds shortcuts to  
bolster its power that forego what Virchow considered a rational organization  
of social programmes. Intervention must be decisive yet limited; control, 
preservation, and economy are more important than thoroughness,  
efficiency, and consistency.192 This ideology is the flipside of Virchow’s liberal 
reformism, which subordinates state power to political principles and the  
public good. Interventionism in Virchow’s mind was not defined by the  
need to preserve the state, but rather the need to preserve liberal values,  
the highest of which was that a liberal government can and must provide  
the material (and medical) basis for freedom, education, and prosperity. It  
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was the tension between these rival ideologies that thwarted the dedicated 
pursuit of liberal health care reform by Virchow. Virchow’s silence on sickness 
insurance, with its explicitly statist rationale and distorted, corporatist  
organization, exemplifies this tension, but in the other matters that did  
claim his interest one sees the same dilemma. 
This chapter will articulate Virchow’s liberal critique of German health  
care with reference to the two tenets of his social science: first, that the state  
must accept responsibility for health by constructing a rational and organized 
public health administration; and second, that the state should leave the  
actual practice of healing as much as possible in the hands of the physician- 
élite, which alone was qualified to bear the burden of social leadership for  
health care. To Virchow, Bismarck’s conservative political system distorted  
the proper relations among science, the medical profession, and the organs  
of government that were dictated by liberal social science. Virchow’s 
parliamentary speeches support this argument by showing his reaction to  
specific health policies that arose in legislative debates. A methodological  
caveat is necessary before proceeding, however. The very circumstance that 
prevented his sustained and consistent parliamentary activity in health  
politics also makes it necessary to treat Virchow’s sporadic utterances  
somewhat outside of their particular context. Only by focusing on the body  
of speeches as a whole is it possible to avoid a belaboured discussion of  
their specific settings, and to trace the broader theme of the distortion of  
German medical politics by conservative ideology.193 
 
The growth of medical science: reformist possibilities, conservative 
limitations 
 
This distortion is clearest in the career of medical science in the last half  
of the nineteenth century. This period witnessed great leaps in the scientific 
understanding of disease, spawning movements aimed at applying new  
medical theories to public health reform. In a sense, Virchow came into his  
own. His progressive politics and all-encompassing idea of social medicine  
still put him far left of centre, but he was much less of a loner on the fringe.  
In 1867, the Assembly of German Natural Scientists and Physicians created  
a special section devoted to hygiene and public health. Two years later, the 
German Quarterly for Public Health Care194 published its first issue and soon 
became the most influential journal for public health reform in Germany.  
Finally, in 1873, the advocates of progressive medicine founded a national 
organization, the German Association for Public Health, to carry their  
reformist message.  
From the outset, these organizations justified public health intervention  
in more conservative terms than Virchow used. Instead of appealing to the  
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ethical right to health enjoyed by each individual, for example, the leaders  
of the public health awakening pointed to the economic and  
social advantages of sanitary reform. Max von Pettenkofer, the Munich  
professor and guru of municipal sanitation, believed that “illness is an object  
that can be expressed in figures” and attempted to calculate the numerical  
value of health to a community. 195  Carl Reclam, one of the editors of the  
German Quarterly, articulated this principle more philosophically on the  
first page of the journal’s premiere issue:  
 
It is not the task of public health to look after the long life or well-being of each  
Individual - rather, it should secure and promote the capacities of the entire  
Population … In that health care aims at providing all citizens without exception  
the physical foundation of a prosperous development, it serves commercial life:  
because the productive power of the state rests on the capacity of indivi duals.196 
 
In parliament, Virchow pragmatically accepted such arguments about health  
care. As long as the ends remained the same, he willingly endorsed both  
economic and ethical justifications. In two speeches from 1868, he advocated 
health reform from a “national-economic standpoint” while simultaneously 
defending the ethical “right to existence that every person has with respect  
to the state”. 197 
More ominous for the conservative direction of public health was its 
depoliticization, which began soon after the first wave of activism of the  
late 1860s. Most of this first wave had centred on municipal sanitary reform,  
and with the success of projects like Berlin’s canalization it became an  
accepted fact, instead of a political claim, that communities had an obligation  
to provide for public health. Advocates of a politicized medicine therefore  
partly lost the “beachhead” that urban reform could have offered for the  
conquest of national health politics. 198  Public health simply became more  
technical and professional. At the German Hygienic Exhibition in Berlin in  
1883, scientists and administrators showcased everything from safely  
designed schooldesks and bathtubs to the latest methods of food inspection  
and groundwater investigation. 199  To be sure, some dedicated physicians  
and scientists besides Virchow continued to carry the banner of political  
medicine. Alfred Grotjahn, the author of Social Pathology, who was  
influenced by the reformist ideas of the liberal Gustav Schmoller, dedicated  
his life to a practical science of “social hygiene” but as a socialist never lost  
touch with politics. 200  
The model physician of Imperial Germany was not Alfred Grotjahn, nor 
certainly Virchow, but Robert Koch. If Virchow spent his formative years  
behind a barricade, Koch spent his behind a microscope. He was the  
incarnation of the diligent, thoroughly professional, apolitical scientist.  
Moreover, Koch’s theory of bacteriology was not only one of the most  
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important medical breakthroughs of the nineteenth century, but also  
pregnant with conservative political implications. Specifically, the now  
familiar idea that disease owes its origins to infectious micro-organisms  
focused medical interventions very narrowly on specific biological causes.  
In contrast to Virchow’s all-encompassing etiology, which admitted social  
as well as biological factors, Koch’s theory concerned local and individual 
pathogens exclusively. Curing patients did not involve radical changes in  
their social milieu; rather, strictly biomedical remedies would suffice.  
Popular memory has fixated on the conflict between Koch’s and Virchow’s 
ideas, and on Virchow’s reluctance to accept the bacteriological theory, but 
contemporary scholarship downplays their differences. 201  Virchow, in fact,  
had nothing against Koch’s theory in itself. He merely thought it dangerous  
to accept it as the sole basis for either medical science or health politics.  
From a scientific standpoint, Virchow believed that many infectious diseases 
could not be traced to a “bacillus”, and for policy reasons he faulted the  
belief that “with the discovery of a bacillus everything necessary has been  
done to do away with a disease”. Virchow believed it was imperative  
that practical achievements complement theoretical discoveries. He argued  
against the needless proliferation of university chairs and institutes for 
bacteriology and hygiene, and instead stressed the success of practical  
innovations, such as the antiseptic revolution in surgery, that came primarily 
through direct experience. Above all, it was necessary to apply all available 
medical knowledge to public health programmes that tangibly affected the  
health of society.202 
 
Practical public health: conservative state intervention and Virchow’s  
liberal alternative 
 
Koch’s theory did in fact furnish the spirit and a good deal of the substance  
for tangible reform, but not in ways that Virchow fully accepted. Koch’s  
ideas simply fit in better with the ideology of conservative state  
interventionism. First, the international fame that his bacteriological theory 
enjoyed underscored the easy prestige that pure scientific discovery could  
win for the German state. The Reich graciously funded Koch’s and other 
scientists’ theoretical researches, and showed its gratitude by inducting him  
into the Order of the Crown, Second Class.203  In so doing, the government  
not only acknowledged a great German physician, but also symbolically  
identified Koch’s advances with the progress of the German nation. Second  
and more concretely, the isolation of infectious micro-organisms opened up  
a whole realm for decisive yet conservative health programmes. The passage  
of commercial regulations on meat and milk inspection, 204  the extension of 
vaccination programmes to a large segment of the population, 205  and the  
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erection of border and shipping controls and local disinfection centres to  
stop the spread of epidemics like cholera 206  attest not only to medicine’s  
ability to apply the bacteriological theory to practical matters, but also to  
the state’s willingness to extend its influence on society in a conservative  
fashion. None of these programmes substantially interfered with the  
economic or social life of the population, nor certainly did they embrace  
the kind of social reform Virchow advocated.  
Virchow applauded these developments in so far as they finally signalled  
the progress of medicine in concrete public health programmes. He shared  
with the Reich authorities a nationalistic pride in Koch’s achievements. 207  
Virchow himself isolated the organism responsible for trichinosis (which  
affected pork), and supervised the construction of meat inspection facilities  
in Berlin that provided the model for national legislation. 208  Finally, he  
approved of state intervention on a philosophical level. He regarded  
compulsory vaccinations as an “eminently appropriate matter for the state” 
because of the consistency and thoroughness that a truly nationwide  
vaccination programme could offer. Measures designed to prevent epidemics 
similarly required a broad-based and coordinated effort to eradicate the  
spread of disease.209 
If Virchow agreed with some of the individual public health programmes 
undertaken by the government, he also made it clear that the conservative  
state interventionism which inspired it was useful only to a certain point. The 
shirking of its responsibilities in chronically underdeveloped regions of the 
country proved to Virchow that the state did not truly conceive of the  
public good as the ultimate aim of health reform. Repeatedly referring in 
parliament to the example of Upper Silesia in 1848, Virchow demanded  
increased state financial and medical assistance to combat epidemics and  
hunger that periodically threatened both Silesia and other disadvantaged  
areas, like East Prussia. Instead of its traditional and irresponsible advocacy  
of private charity, the state should act to compensate for the deficiencies of  
local aid. Maintaining that its “appeal to self-help is the surest sign of ... 
the insufficiencies of a province” and the inadequacy of local initiative, he 
advocated a swift response to “extraordinary circumstances” that  
temporarily disabled such initiative. Importantly, the state’s response should  
avoid “overwhelming” localities, and focus instead on sowing the seeds for  
a more capable local self-help should future depredations occur. This the 
government would accomplish through its unique power to equalize gross 
inconsistencies among different provinces, by redistributing tax revenues,  
and through its gentle nurturing of local self-government in backward areas  
where the “historical feeling” for such an institution was weakly developed.  
In sum, the proper sphere of government lay in fostering the liberal local  
institutions which would ensure a truly effective “self-help”.210 
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Virchow was referring here to the intermittent opportunities that  
governments had to eradicate chronic and repetitive misfortunes, but he  
also applied his belief in responsible liberal government to the day-to-day  
institutions of public health, whose organization he found slipshod and  
ineffectual. He focused particular blame on the activities of the Imperial  
Health Office, created in 1876 to coordinate all health affairs for the Empire.  
As defined by its charter, the mandate of the Office included advising  
the Chancellor on pertinent health matters, drafting medical legislation, 
monitoring public health developments in foreign countries, and collecting 
medical statistics on the Reich.211  In 1881 Virchow declared that the Office  
was not living up to its mandate. Since its founding, he argued, the Office’s  
staff had been enticed into investigations on the cutting edge of medicine  
instead of the humdrum task of preparing practical legislative suggestions.  
The published reports from the Office contained unsigned and controversial 
scientific articles that more properly belonged in medical journals. The  
seduction by theory betokened a deeper neglect of those practical activities  
that alone contributed to an effective public health administrat ion. 212 
From the top down, the organs of health administration evidenced a  
similar irresponsibility. To Virchow, a liberal state recognized that a  
responsible administration conducted its affairs rationally and efficiently,  
and he maintained as late as 1895 that “we cannot say that the Reich has  
an orderly set of laws to refer to in its interventions. The German Reich  
possesses to this day no law that exactly spells out the boundaries of  
power and responsibility for the individual administrative authorities”. 213  
He claimed that a proper delineation of state authority must join medical 
knowledge with executive power. Doctors should replace jurists at the head  
of public health organizations; they should be exempted from the “foreign 
influences” of the police; and the whole organization of public health should  
be moved from the competence of the Cultural Ministry and placed under  
the aegis of the Interior Ministry. This change would not only eliminate the 
“confessional” prejudices under which medicine suffered in the Cultural  
Ministry, but also provide “everything necessary for the present organization  
of medical affairs”, namely a powerful administration. 214  The handling of 
veterinary medicine, whose organization had enjoyed such improvements, 
demonstrated what the marriage of science and executive authority could 
accomplish in such areas as meat inspection and the prevention of animal 
epidemics.215 
Virchow reserved special attention for the intermediate and lower levels  
of public health organization. In 1868 he presented a specific proposal for  
reform, in which he emphasized that the traditional tasks for regional public  
health authorities in Prussia needed a redefinition for modern times. 216  The 
customary duties of state physicians in Prussia - performing autopsies and 
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rendering expert medical opinions in court cases - struck him as increasingly 
anachronistic. The state could better allocate its resources by transferring  
emphasis from forensic medicine to the “medical police” (medizinische  
Polizei), a term which in German refers not to law enforcement but to the  
state’s entire low-level regulatory apparatus. The medical police regulated  
the sale of food and drugs, oversaw vaccination programmes, collected  
medical statistics, inspected homes and businesses, monitored the spread of 
infectious diseases and supervised disinfection and sanitation measures, and 
generally transmitted legal and administrative orders on health care into  
practical effect.217 To implement this reorientation toward a greater executive 
competence, Virchow advocated a two-tiered organizational reform. On the 
regional level, the governmental medical councils (along with local “sanitary 
commissions”), which had medical police functions, should replace the 
obsolescent provincial medical colleges, whose purely advisory role in public 
health affairs and preoccupation with medical jurisprudence made them 
unnecessary. 218  On the local level, Virchow favoured the consolidation  
of the offices of county physician (Kreisphysikus) and county surgeon  
(Kreiswundarzt)219 into one position with police authority, not simply because  
only one official was necessary to do the job, but also because he could  
then be paid twice as much. On this lowest and most despised public health 
official 220  depended the effectiveness of all practical regulations emanating  
from the higher Prussian and German authorities. Into the 1870s Virchow  
used his influence on the Budget Commission in the Prussian legislature to  
press continually for higher salaries for the county doctors, because he was  
“convinced that the government is obligated to appoint officials who at  
least have a safe enough existence that they do not have to turn to private  
practice” and who will therefore be free to “promote an effective public  
health [administration] necessary in the interest of the people” . 221 
The government did not implement Virchow’s public health reform. The  
best it could do was to offer in 1872 a modest pay raise for the county  
doctors, the foot-soldiers of public health, and cover their train trips and  
other expenses incurred in the discharge of their duties.222 In the opinion of  
most contemporaries, the top-heavy, overly theoretical, and poorly organized 
administration of public health in Germany remained an obstacle to  
meaningful reform throughout the nineteenth century. 223  Conservative state 
interventionism simply did not have the commitment to the nuts and bolts  
of organizational reform that Virchow advocated.  
 
The medical profession and its dependence on the state 
 
Virchow’s concern for empowering the country doctors had aimed at  
enhancing the state’s ability to undertake meaningful public health reform  
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on the grassroots level. The sheer scope of government health programmes, 
however, required it to step outside its network of official state physicians.  
In its vaccination programmes, the government relied upon quasi-official  
doctors certified to administer inoculations;224  and in the sickness insurance  
funds, local fund directors contracted with semi-private physicians who  
provided medical care for insured workers.225 Most significantly, the ongoing 
medicalization of the population increased the importance of decisions on  
whether and how to test, license and police a body of private physicians  
growing in size and influence. From 1827 to 1887 the proportion of state-
employed physicians dropped from 49 per cent (out of 1,919) to only 12  
per cent (out of 15,824). 226  The development of a relationship between the  
(private) medical profession and the government did not occur in a context  
of free negotiation between equals. Unlike the American example, where  
the profession grew almost autonomously of state influence, 227  professional  
consolidation in Germany took place under the tutelage and direction of  
the state. This entangled, obtrusive, and sometimes stormy relationship was  
for Virchow the most grievous instance of a misdirected conservative state 
interventionism. In parliament he focused particular activity on freeing the 
profession from what he believed was an oppressive and illiberal system.  
The state’s paternalistic relationship to the medical profession had 
continued unabated after the medical reform movement in 1848-9. In 1852  
it finally granted traditional doctors the right to practise in all spheres of  
medicine, from surgery to internal medicine to obstetrics. 228  This act set a 
precedent by tying professional improvement to state initiative and succeeded  
in winning the support of many doctors. Virchow was prominent among  
the minority which continued to oppose state tutelage. In 1860, he helped  
lead the Berlin Medical Society, whose constituency had been liberal at least  
since 1848-9, to demand an end to the onerous state interference represented  
by its anti-quackery laws and provisions for forced medical treatment by  
doctors. 229  The political influence of the Berlin society enabled one of its 
representatives to campaign successfully for an official acceptance of this  
demand soon after the founding of the North German Union (the precursor  
state to the Empire). In 1869 Reichstag representative Loewe (Virchow did  
not have a Reichstag seat at this time) reiterated the medical reformers’  
arguments about anti-quackery laws, holding them as ineffective and poorly 
enforced, and asked for their abolition as a de jure acknowledgement of de  
facto conditions of free competition that had long obtained in Germany. 230  
Later that year, the German Trade Ordinance made medicine an unregulated  
trade and preserved only the title of “doctor” (Arzt) as the legally protected 
privilege of state-licensed physicians.231 
The objection of the profession as a whole did not become manifest until 
several years after the Trade Ordinance, because physicians were still not  
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well-organized. The very organizational immaturity which made traditional 
doctors fear free competition from natural healers, homeopaths, and plain  
quacks also made an articulate rebuttal against Virchow’s camp in the Berlin 
Society all but impossible. Finally, however, the German Union of Medical 
Societies was formed in 1873 for the stated purpose of defending the  
profession’s interests through a demand that the state organize and officially 
sanction representative organs for the entire medical profession. Seven years  
later the Union explicitly demanded the re-regulation of medical practice  
through the abrogation of the relevant sections in the Trade Ordinance. 232  
In 1882, at its annual meeting, the Union representatives drafted a list of 
“Fundamentals for a German Medical Ordinance” which further clarified the 
dominant strain of professional opinion: doctors should retain trade  
freedoms that concerned the actual exercise of their practices (including the 
collection of fees), but should become subject to state-sanctioned medical  
boards that would replace unrestricted practice with a collegial supervision  
that embraced disciplinary measures against derelict physicians .233 
These developments put Virchow in the odd position of defending his 
profession against what he viewed as its own Faustian short-sightedness. 
Throughout the 1880s he campaigned in parliament against the profession’s 
demands for a return to protective regulatory legislation. In this crusade,  
Virchow returned to his claim from 1848-9 that the medical profession, like  
all other groups in society, functioned best when its energies were granted  
free reign. This advocacy of an empowered élite sprang from a personal belief  
in the nobility and benevolent social influence of the medical profession. As  
he admitted in 1883, “I am somewhat seduced by the experiences I have  
had in my own occupation”. His admiration for the heroic enterprise of  
medicine led him to assert its right for a privileged political standing, since  
the reciprocal “claims” that were in turn made upon physicians “in many  
cases exceed what is demanded of other persons, in civilian life”.234 Carrying  
such a high moral burden, doctors should be as exempt as possible from  
state regulation, because in general, “doctors have on the whole devoted 
themselves to an honourable life” and therefore needed no regulation. To  
be sure, the state had a role in abetting doctors in their medical pursuits,  
but this influence should be confined to “cooperation”, not regulation. With  
regard to the state’s interest in assuring a well-organized profession, Virchow  
held that doctors’ “intelligence” plus their “human feeling” would bring  
them to organize themselves.235 This unswerving - and, it must be said, uncritical 
- dedication to a free medical profession is a clear example of his personal 
tendency towards espousing simple political dogmas. None the  
less, the frustrations that this libertarian position entailed stemmed not so  
much from his personal quirks as from his commitment to liberal social  
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science. The chances for professional freedom as the precondition for the 
physician-élite’s exalted and benevolent social role were undermined by the  
 
complex history of professional politics which tended ever more towards 
government meddling. 
In 1886-7 Virchow experienced his first major disappointment in the  
struggle against state regulation of the medical profession. Even as he  
continued to speak out in parliament against the “guildlike” organization  
of the profession, expressing his fear of “bureaucratic power”,236 the Prussian 
government was preparing a reversal of the passive stance it had taken ever  
since professional deregulation in 1869. In 1887, following the demands of  
the doctors’ Union and the lead of other German Länder - Baden in 1864, 
followed by Saxony, Brunswick, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Hessen - 
Prussia bypassed parliament and issued a decree establishing medical boards  
to represent all physicians within its borders.237  The structure and authority  
of the boards did not in themselves betray overweening state influence.  
Doctors presided over the boards (and of course formed their constituency),  
and though a state official would be present at their meetings, he would  
exercise no vote in the proceedings, the main reason for his presence 
being to prevent abuse of disciplinary privileges by doctors against their 
colleagues. 238  The main purpose of the organizations was simply to bring  
doctors together to discuss professional matters, attain a unified voice in  
subjects of professional interest, furnish expert opinions on public health  
matters to the relevant state officials, and provide financial support from a 
common fund to physicians who were struggling in their practices (through  
the so-called Umlagerecht). But even these activities conferred substantial  
state-supported political power on the profession, and therefore the mere  
fact of the state’s initiative in setting up the boards represented for Virchow  
an unacceptable meddling. 239 
What made the boards truly intolerable, however, was the extension of 
disciplinary jurisdiction against malpracticing doctors in the 1890s. In the  
original decree of 1887, disciplinary procedure was limited to denying errant 
physicians the right to vote in board decisions. 240  But in 1892, with the  
support of the doctors’ union, 241  a commission of representatives from  
the Prussian medical boards declared its support for disciplinary councils 
(Ehrengerichte) whose powers would still be limited to disfranchisement and  
fines, but which for the first time would enjoy a quasi-legal standing and  
possibly include lawyers, as well as doctors, as judges on the tribunals. The 
commission’s vote was ten in favour, two against, Virchow being one of the 
dissenters. 242  In parliament that year, Virchow vented his aggravation with 
supporters of the tribunals like Dr Eduard Graf who believed that a “more 
guildlike” organization of the profession would, through enforcement of  
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discipline, increase the “esteem of the German public” for the medical 
community. 243  Through the rest of the decade discussions continued, during  
which time Virchow led the Berlin Medical Society in opposition to the  
tribunals, in contrast to twelve Prussian medical boards who supported  
them. 244  Finally, in 1899, the government promulgated a law establishing  
the tribunals with the support of most of the legislature. 245  Virchow again  
spoke for the minority when he maintained that the small number of  
disciplinary cases did not warrant state intervention to preserve doctors’  
honour and stated that the government’s vague definition of what constituted 
malpractice would lead to “arbitrariness” in judgements. Finally, he  
reiterated his belief in the necessity of a free and liberal association of  
doctors, in which publicity, openness, and debate would provide all the  
necessary force required to bring delinquent physicians in to line.246 
Virchow failed to realize that the disciplinary councils merely laid the  
keystone in the conservative professional-governmental complex that  
developed under the aegis of an interventionist, regulating state in the  
nineteenth century. Disciplinary jurisdiction was the link that joined the  
political organization of the medical profession to the policing power in  
which both doctors and the state had an interest. Physicians wished to exclude 
competition from quacks, and the state claimed the right of intervention in  
the name of securing quality in medical care. At the same time, this cosy 
condominium of shared interest exhibited serious fault lines, as is illustrated  
by the growth of sickness insurance funds after 1883. The establishment of 
sickness insurance constituted the single most important development in  
the history of professional politics in the last quarter of the nineteenth  
century. The scheme’s provision, allowing local funds to contract with  
physicians to dispense medical treatment, demonstrated just how entangled  
and conflicting the two interests had become in the Empire. The state- 
sanctioned insurance funds, in their desire to minimize costs by increasing  
control over physicians - who enjoyed a monopoly on deciding which  
patients counted as “sick” and what treatment they needed - attempted to  
restrict the number of doctors who were allowed to treat fund members. In  
turn, physicians, who competed heavily for slots as fund doctors, protested  
against these restrictions and demanded “free doctor choice” for patients.247  
By 1900, a vociferous new pressure group, the so-called Leipziger Verband,  
had been formed, and it resorted to physician strikes to defend professional  
interests.248 
It is in this context that Virchow’s minimal contribution to the debate on 
sickness insurance finally becomes important. In two speeches of 1891-2 he 
attempted to bolster the profession’s position and restrict competition for  
fund slots.249 Specifically, he advocated an end to the practice of recognizing 
natural healers (Naturärzte) who were not licensed medical doctors but who  
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had acquired a de facto right to dispense care in many insurance funds.250  
He went so far as to propose an amendment to the 1883 law (which was  
being revised at that time anyway) legally restricting uncertified healers  
from participating in the funds. 251  This stance appears to be a lapse of his 
traditional objection to state patronage, but actually makes sense given the  
logic of the 1869 deregulation he had helped propose, which had allowed  
free medical practice but protected the title of doctor. In his opposition to  
natural healers he was merely following his conventional argument that the  
state must tolerate such freedom but not actively sanction it. He said it  
would be a “disloyal procedure” if the state failed to support traditional  
doctors in this instance, and stated that he “would regard it as a great loss  
if through a hesitant activity the doctors’ position, which it has recently  
won, would become lost”. 252 
Though true to his own philosophy, Virchow underestimated the scale of  
the larger professional politics in which he played a part. In petitioning for  
the exclusion of natural healers (in which enterprise he failed, incidentally253),  
he unwittingly advanced claims appropriate not only for his particular  
conception of “liberal” state-profession relations, but also for the greater  
political struggle connected with the problems of an interlocking and  
unstable association between the government and the medical community.  
In political reality, if not in his own mind, he therefore relied on the  
conservative state interventionism which had guided the development of this 
association since before 1848. This fact can only serve to underline the lack  
of a suitable context characterizing Virchow’s national health politics. His  
cogent critique of state irresponsibility and disorganization in its own public 
health affairs does contrast with his ultimate failure to grasp the political 
significance of professional regulation in insurance funds, after so many  
years of resistance to such regulation. Whether he was pointing out the  
flaws in an illiberal state or exhibiting his idolization of a healing profession, 
Virchow demonstrated the inapplicability of his liberal health politics in a  
climate of conservative state interventionism. The twin tasks of national  
health politics - public health and professional regulation - offered  
opportunities for Virchow’s liberal social science, with its emphasis on  
state sponsorship of health programmes and collaboration with a freely  
constituted élite, but the failures of liberalism to stamp its political forms  
on the German State rendered such opportunities ultimately fruitless.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Virchow and the Legacy 
of German Liberalism 
 
 
The past two centuries have witnessed a profound shift in the meaning of 
liberalism: from a nineteenth-century ideology based on individual freedoms, 
laissez-faire economics, and limited government to a twenty-first-century  
worldview embracing welfare programmes, economic management and  
state intervention. What light can Rudolf Virchow’s career shed on this 
development? As early as 1848, Virchow had developed a political philosophy 
marrying classical liberal principles with a governmental responsibility for  
social well-being. He then applied this ideological synthesis to health reform 
activities throughout his life. One could therefore regard Virchow, with his 
innovative brand of medical politics, as a transitional figure in the broad  
history of Western liberalism. It is rare, however, for any German liberal  
to be seen in this way, as a forerunner to the modern progressive. For in  
German history it is impossible to speak of the prolonged transition from  
“classical” to “welfare-state” liberalism without reference to the tremendous 
upheaval which punctuates it: National Socialism. Far from seeing in  
nineteenth-century German liberalism the seeds of the modern welfare state, 
scholars have identified its failure as a political movement as one of  
the primary preconditions for Nazism’s rise. Before situating my specific 
arguments on Virchow’s socially progressive philosophy into German  
liberalism at large, it is therefore necessary to address liberalism’s troubled  
p a s t .  
Ralf Dahrendorf’s 1967 question crystallizes the problem of liberal failure: 
“Why is it that so few in Germany embraced the principle of liberal  
democracy?” To him, nineteenth-century liberals failed to erect a political  
system based on equality, pluralism, institutionalized conflict, and “public  
virtues”. This deficiency meant that Germany’s pre-industrial, authoritarian 
political structures survived largely unmodified into the twentieth century  
and ultimately helped Hitler to power. 254  Many scholars of Dahrendorf’s  
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generation have supported his basic view of liberal complicity in a “faulted 
nation”. The collapse of liberal-democratic ambitions in the 1848 revolution, 
followed by the liberal defeat in the so-called Constitutional Conflict of  
1862-6, are said to have revealed two crucial weaknesses in liberal politics.  
First, the liberals failed to curry enough support with the masses to mount  
an effective campaign against the forces of reaction. According to Theodore 
Hamerow’s analysis of the 1848 revolution, their espousal of laissez-faire 
economic and social doctrines alienated artisans who stood to lose a great  
deal through the abolition of guild privileges, and their unwillingness to  
sacrifice the liberal right to property drove away peasants who believed that 
revolutionary expropriation and agrarian reform were the only solutions  
for their hunger. 255  James Sheehan and others have argued that the liberal 
party lacked a sufficient social base to stage a muscular opposition against 
Bismarck’s unconstitutional appropriation of state funds for the military in 
1862-6. Despite the backing of an impressive number of ancillary bourgeois 
political organizations, the liberals still feared losing the support of the Volk  
at large, and this led them to cave in to Bismarck when he offered national 
unification as a quid pro quo for their acquiescence in his illegal rule. 256  
With the increasing importance of mass politics after the 1860s and 1870s,  
the party of Bildung und Besitz (education and property) never fully overcame  
its roots in an elitist political outlook. In fact, during this period, the history  
of the liberal parties revolved more around their internal fragmentation  
than their weakened claim to represent society as a whole.  
The second failure of German liberalism is much more damning, because  
it points to its ideological predisposition to romanticize an authoritarian  
state. According to scholars like Otto Pflanze and Leonard Krieger, what  
made it so easy for liberals to succumb to Bismarck in 1866 was their deep- 
seated admiration of his power. 257  Pflanze suggests that the seminal choice  
of a powerful, unified Bismarckian state over a liberal legal state (or  
Rechtsstaat) was conditioned by liberals’ statist inclinations and social  
weakness. Their “capitulation” in 1866  
 
had been prepared for more than a century in the development of the German liberal  
tradition. Its origin lay in the delayed growth of the German middle class, the  
peculiar coupling of freedom and authority … the Hegelian deification of the state,  
and the romantic glorification of force. The liberals were the victims of their own  
limited ends, their lack of genuine support, and their lust for national power … 
Never had they aimed at full responsibility for the management of public affairs. 258 
 
Devoid of popular resonance - so the argument goes - the liberals fled into  
the arms of a powerful nation-state whose semi-constitutional structure  
provided no guarantee against an authoritarian political system careering  
towards the Nazi catastrophe of the next century. In a very provocative  
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formulation, Hans-Ulrich Wehler has characterized the “sham  
constitutionalism” resulting from the liberal capitulation as the ideological 
 
complement to the deeper “structural” deficiencies that predisposed  
Germany to crisis, instabil ity, and ult imately, dictatorship259 
This image of a lockstep march toward National Socialism has been  
sharply criticized in the last two decades. David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley  
have tried to reclaim the contingent nature of Imperial German politics  
from what they perceive as an overdetermined course of failure. In particular,  
they take issue with the common view that the spinelessness of the German 
bourgeoisie is to blame for liberalism’s defeat in high politics. Eley disputes  
the “conceptual slippage” between the middle class and its putative ideology,  
an elision that “ascribes to the bourgeoisie as a class the set of values  
(liberalism) that according to the textbook it should have held”. 260  Both  
Eley and Blackbourn proceed to flesh out a sphere of peculiarly bourgeois  
politics. Eley, for example, defends German industrialists’ illiberal “right- 
wing” politics as the product of “capitalist rationality” instead of bourgeois  
failure. Blackbourn concentrates more on a “silent bourgeois revolution”  
and a subtly hidden “shadow society” upon which the bourgeoisie imprinted  
its class interest without the constitutional changes in high politics associated  
with liberal ideology. To some extent, this decoupling of bourgeois politics  
from the fortunes of liberalism has cleared a space for the positive re- 
evaluation of liberalism’s own strengths, especially in the “shadow” realm  
of culture and society.261 More pronounced, however, is the tendency among 
scholars working in the wake of Blackbourn and Eley to rehabilitate non- 
liberal forms of bourgeois hegemony in German society. Insofar as these 
scholars’ interventions have rescued the bourgeoisie from a failed liberalism, 
they have to some extent left liberalism itself in the lurch.262 
My approach is to claim for German liberalism a more nuanced history  
that is the political analogue to Blackbourn and Eley’s model of a more  
socially complex and contingent German development in the nineteenth  
century. 263  Just as Blackbourn and Eley argue for a certain “rationality” in 
bourgeois politics - as a more sophisticated alternative to the argument  
that regards their illiberalism as a political miscalculation or moral lapse - 
so I am trying to explain German liberalism in terms of its own rational  
dynamic. I want to stress that the liberals’ embrace of élitism and statism  
did not stem so much from their political timidity, ideological legacy, or  
inherent unpopularity as from the structural difficulties involved in applying 
liberal principles to German politics. It is in the realm of practical, as  
opposed to constitutional, politics that these structural conditions become  
clearest. The model of the “liberal social scientist”, and specifically the  
career of Virchow, lend some rhyme and reason to the traditional liberal  
 67 
 
problems of social exclusivity and reliance upon the state, which have  
otherwise been interpreted in narrow moralizing terms.  
 
In this study I have argued that Virchow’s élitism was grounded in the  
belief that practical social reform could only be achieved by a body of  
selected leaders. In his early years Virchow acquired this perspective from  
the humanistic but paternalistic practice of medical healing, and this outlook 
carried him through the rest of his life. When he applied his liberal values  
to social politics, therefore, he was concerned to “heal” society - curing it  
through a radical dose of freedom, education, and prosperity but at the  
same time protecting it from an injurious social revolution. To effect this  
forceful but limited change it was necessary to place the dynamic energies  
of scientific rationality in the safe hands of an enlightened and activist élite. 
Viewed in this way, Virchow’s élitism reflects not so much an estrangement  
from society as the conviction that it must enjoy some form of tutelary  
guidance. We saw this in his advocacy of an educated and indigenous  
leadership in Silesia for “medicine on a grand scale” there; in his struggle  
to make doctors the “natural advocates of the poor” through medical and 
professional reform; in his personal activity as the physician-reformer in  
Berlin’s canalization; in his cooperation with a broader municipal leadership  
in the same project - with engineers like Hobrecht and Wiebe and with  
reformist laymen on the city council and Magistrat; and in his parliamentary 
campaigns for professional freedom. In all of these instances, Virchow  
believed that to bear the standard of social progress, the élite must exercise  
a more broadly diffused power than that wielded by an oppressively  
centralized state. His belief in a self-regulated medical profession based on  
the liberal model of the free association is the clearest application of this  
principle. But in general it was the liberal belief that society could manage  
its own affairs that led Virchow to promote an empowered élite free of state 
meddling.  
At the same time as he campaigned for limiting government power,  
however, Virchow was inexorably led to invoke the state as a mediator  
between the reformist élite and the society it sought to elevate. Virchow’s  
radical liberalism, and in particular his staunch opposition to Bismarck,  
prove that he was not succumbing here to some authoritarian impulse.  
Rather, he saw the construction of a rational, responsible government as  
the primary task of modern liberalism. Having witnessed the suffering in  
Silesia, Virchow had realized that a classical liberal ideology based on  
individual freedom is irrelevant in a society where individuals do not enjoy  
the material basis to exercise it. The progressive state that he envisioned  
protected liberal values precisely through its intervention in society, by  
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gently uplifting the people. This meant that the state must balance its 
responsibility to promote a prosperous, liberal society with a strictly liberal 
conduct in its own affairs. In 1848-9 Virchow proclaimed this necessity in 
philosophical terms, and could only hint at its practical application, because  
the victory of the forces of reaction during the revolution dashed the chances  
for liberal governmental reform. But in Berlin he found a “state” - in the  
form of city government - congenial to his reformist impulses. Canalization  
was the ideal example of a health-conscious reform that imposed as little  
as possible on the free development of society. In parliament, Virchow  
further articulated his ideal of the progressive state: his idea of a state- 
sponsored public health emphasized the application of the rapidly growing  
science of medicine to health care reform. Specifically, he stressed the  
necessity of a “liberal” orchestration of state power and medical knowledge, 
coupled with a responsibility for disadvantaged areas and a rational and  
effective administration. Above all, the way to fashion a liberal state - and  
avoid dangerous meddling - lay in encouraging as far as possible the energies  
of an independent medical profession. But when Virchow’s idea of a liberal 
government met up against a dominant ideology of conservative state  
interventionism, his national health politics languished in obscurity.  
This view of liberal social science - and the logic of containment that  
binds liberal principles, an empowered élite, and a constitutional state - 
will, I hope, illustrate the dilemmas of German liberalism in a more  
sympathetic fashion than most scholarship allows. For one thing, it facilitates  
a renewed appreciation for German liberals’ long-term contributions to  
the Sozialstaat, the post-World War II “social state” combining liberal 
constitutionalism with a social safety net. German social liberalism has long 
been the object of scholarly attention, whether as a missed opportunity to  
avoid the social fragmentation and political polarization of the Weimar  
Republic, or, more ominously, as a movement that itself succumbed to the 
nationalist and imperialist ideologies paving the way for Nazism.264 In either 
case, this literature remains captive to peculiarly German concerns. Little 
attention has therefore been paid to Germany’s impact on Western social 
liberalism as a whole. Historians working elsewhere, by contrast, have begun  
to realize just how many of the social-reformist departures in nineteenth- 
century Germany became incorporated into both the European and  
American progressive movements. 265  Virchow’s career illustrates what was 
specifically liberal about these departures and the twentieth-century 
progressivism they helped to inspire. His activity combined the need to 
intervene in social affairs with the desire to preserve and promote individual 
rights, constitutional government, and the supremacy of reason. In so far  
as modern progressive movements also work within this framework, they  
owe their political origins to liberalism. Liberalism’s contribution remains  
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all the more powerful for being largely inconspicuous: that the modern  
welfare state incorporates these principles almost as articles of faith is a  
testament to its pervasive success.  
 
Virchow’s accomplishments shed fresh light on both the possibilities and  
the problems of social liberalism. In retrospect it is easy to perceive in  
Virchow the arrogance of the technocratic reformer or the naïveté of the 
egalitarian idealist, to name two vices plaguing many contemporary welfare-
state liberals. Yet these judgements distort the nature of his achievement  
through the lens of twenty-first-century hindsight. They fail, in particular,  
to appreciate the ways scientism and humanism checked and tempered each 
other in Virchow’s practical work. Science and the humanities, what C P  
Snow called the “two cultures” of twentieth-century intellectual life, enjoyed  
a much less antagonistic, mutually uncomprehending relation in Virchow’s  
day. His liberal social science showed this. At the same time, his career  
offers us little guidance in understanding liberalism’s relation to disciplines 
beyond his ken. Virchow showed little interest in the softer social sciences,  
like cultural anthropology, sociology and economics, where humanistic  
enquiry and technical analysis converge and compete most strongly. And  
while this deficit can hardly be faulted in a man whose dedication to  
other fields limited him to four hours’ sleep a night, Virchow cleaved 
temperamentally to the certainties of hard-nosed empiricism, measuring  
skulls with calipers and scrutinizing cells under microscopes. He  
systematically avoided the fuzzy science of social criticism, where judgement, 
discretion, and intuition were most needed. Unwittingly he conceded an  
entire spectrum of intellectual problems to the eugenicist and racist social 
thinkers who soon took them up. None the less, Virchow placed German 
medicine on an unshakably scientific basis. His social science never lost  
touch with the material problems of human life. That his medical politics  
also inspired practical reforms of undeniable value secures his place in the 
development of a more humane Western liberalism. 
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Abbreviations 
 
BKW Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 
CEPHE Collected Essays on Public Health and Epidemiology 
DVföG Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für öffentliche Gesundheitspflege 
MR Die medicinische Reform 
SBHA  Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des  
  Landtages, Haus der Abgeordneten 
SBR  Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des  
  Reichstags 
Virchow Nachlaß Virchow, Zentrales Archiv, Akademie der  
    papers Wissenschaften, Berlin 
 
Note:  Prussian Landtag and German Reichstag speeches (found in SBHA  
and SBR respectively) are cited by the date of the speech, the page  
numbers in the published proceedings, and the name of the speaker, as in  
the following example: 
 
 SBHA 9 Jan 1872, 299 (Virchow).
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